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MORTGAGE MODIFICATION, EQUITABLE
SUBORDINATION, AND THE HONEST BUT
UNFORTUNATE CREDITOR
Juliet M. Moringiello*
Mortgage foreclosures are at an all-time high and property values in
many parts of the country have declined precipitously. Yet bankruptcy,
which is often a last resort for individuals in financial distress, provides
little relief to a homeowner who finds that her mortgage debt exceeds the
value of her home. The reason for bankruptcy’s inadequacy in this regard
is the Bankruptcy Code’s prohibition on the modification of home
mortgages, a prohibition that became part of bankruptcy law in 1978 when
most home mortgage loans were thirty-year fixed rate loans made by
savings and loan associations. While most secured loans can be stripped
down in bankruptcy, reflecting the payment that the lender would receive if
it were forced to foreclose on the collateral, a home mortgage loan must be
paid in full, giving the lender more than it would receive under state law.
In recent years, abusive mortgage practices have proliferated. These
abusive practices, which have prevented homeowners from building equity
in their homes, harm not only the debtor but also the debtor’s other
creditors. Despite their behavior, however, home mortgage lenders who
engage in these practices continue to receive favorable treatment in
bankruptcy. In this Article, I argue that creditors should be denied special
treatment in bankruptcy unless they behave in an “honest but unfortunate”
manner. Judges can deny this special treatment by using a time-honored
bankruptcy principle, the principle of equitable subordination, to
subordinate the unsecured portion of a home mortgage loan to all secured
and priority claims. While equitable subordination, by itself, will not solve
the foreclosure crisis, it may, by reducing the claims of abusive mortgagees,
deter abusive lending practices in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy, with its underlying policy of relief for the honest but
unfortunate debtor, is an important mechanism for relieving financial
distress. In the current mortgage crisis, however, bankruptcy is an
inadequate tool because of the special treatment of home mortgage creditors
under the Bankruptcy Code (Code). Chapter 13 of the Code prohibits the
modification of claims secured only by a security interest in the debtor’s
principal residence. 1 The effect of this prohibition is particularly severe on
homeowners who owe more on their mortgage loans than their homes are
worth. Many of these “underwater” mortgages are products of the abusive
lending practices that have proliferated in the past decade, but regardless of
the mortgage lender’s behavior, the lender is entitled to favorable treatment
in Chapter 13.
Most creditors are guaranteed only their state law property rights in
bankruptcy, but home mortgage creditors can receive far more—they are
entitled to full payment of their claims according to the original terms of the
mortgage loan. 2 Therefore, a debtor who owes $350,000 on a house worth
only $250,000 must pay the entire $350,000 after filing for bankruptcy.
This favorable treatment is unique to home mortgagees; other secured
creditors are guaranteed full payment of only the value of their collateral,
and if their collateral is worth less than they are owed, they are treated as
unsecured creditors for the amount by which the outstanding loan exceeds

1. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006). This prohibition is discussed in Part II.A, infra.
2. Id.
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the value of the collateral. 3 This bifurcation of an undersecured creditor’s
claim reflects that creditor’s foreclosure distribution because a foreclosing
secured creditor receives the value of its collateral at the foreclosure sale
and must pursue the debtor personally for the often uncollectible
deficiency. 4
Today, a staggering number of homeowners are struggling to pay
mortgage obligations that exceed the value of their homes. At the end of
the third quarter of 2010, 22.5% of all residential properties with mortgages
were encumbered by mortgages that exceeded the property’s value.5
Although declining home prices in many parts of the country contributed to
this situation, the abusive lending practices that proliferated in the years
preceding the recent foreclosure crisis exacerbated the problem. Thirty
years ago, most home loans were amortized over thirty years with a fixed
rate of interest. Lenders required full documentation of the borrower’s
income, and monthly payments bore a reasonable relationship to the
borrower’s income. Immediately before the recent mortgage meltdown,
many mortgage loans were non-amortizing (meaning that the monthly
payments included no payments towards the principal amount of the loan),
large in relation to both the borrower’s income and the value of the home,
and were made with little or no documentation of the borrower’s financial
status. 6 Rather than helping homeowners build wealth by building equity in
their homes, these lending practices diminished homeowner wealth.
Home mortgage creditors are entitled to full payment regardless of their
behavior in the initiation of the loan because the Code has no explicit policy
of providing relief only to the honest but unfortunate creditor. The recent
mortgage crisis has led to calls to allow debtors to modify their home
mortgages in Chapter 13. Several bills to ameliorate the effects of the antimodification provision have been introduced in Congress—all failed to
pass. 7 There was also a robust debate in the press about mortgage
modification, with some arguing that modification would result in a

3. Id. §§ 506(b), 1325(a)(5). Some automobile lenders are also entitled to full payment
of their claims regardless of the value of their collateral, but those lenders are not entitled to
their original loan terms. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(*) (the “hanging paragraph” at the end of
§ 1325(a)).
4. In some states, anti-deficiency laws would prevent the mortgage lender from
collecting the deficiency regardless of the borrower’s financial condition. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814 (2007) (prohibiting deficiency judgments on loans secured by a
single-family or two family residence on 2.5 acres or less); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b
(West 1976 & Supp. 2010) (prohibiting deficiency judgments on purchase-money mortgage
loans secured by a one to four family residence).
5. Press Release, CoreLogic, New CoreLogic Data Shows Third Consecutive Quarterly
Decline in Negative Equity (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.corelogic.com
/uploadedFiles/Pages/About_Us/ResearchTrends/Q3_2010_Negative_Equity_FINAL.pdf.
The CoreLogic report notes that the decline in negative equity was due primarily to
foreclosures of underwater mortgages rather than rising home prices. Id. The states with the
highest percentage of negative equity mortgages during that period were Nevada (67%),
Arizona (49%), and Florida (46%). Id.
6. I explain the changes in lending practices in Part II.B, infra.
7. See infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
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windfall for homeowners and great losses for lenders. 8 The Obama
Administration, through the Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP), 9 tried to encourage mortgage holders to modify mortgages
outside of bankruptcy, but that program has been a dismal failure, with only
a fraction of eligible homeowners receiving permanent modifications,10 and
a high rate of re-default among those receiving permanent modifications.11
There is little doubt that the number of mortgage foreclosures will remain at
historically unprecedented levels 12 and that a bankruptcy filing will not help
many debtors remain in their homes unless home mortgages can be
modified. 13
The Code may already allow judges to modify some home mortgages,
however. In this Article I encourage judges to use existing Code provisions
to modify home mortgages in cases in which the mortgage lender engaged
in abusive lending practices. My thesis is that in order for a creditor to take
8. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Judges Fix Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2009, at A27 (arguing that permitting mortgage modification will swamp the bankruptcy
courts); Todd J. Zywicki, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Judges Tear up Mortgage Contracts, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 13, 2009, at A13 (arguing that mortgage modification will result in a windfall to
borrowers and an increase in bankruptcy filings). But see David M. Abromowitz, Cram
Down Crunch Time, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2009, 9:13 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-m-abromowitz/cram-down-crunchtime_b_171721.html (noting that “[f]ew Americans realize that single family homeowners
living in their own primary residence are the only real estate owners without cram down
protections in bankruptcy”).
9. See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/ (Feb. 14, 2011).
10. In his October 2010 Quarterly Report to Congress, Neil Barofsky, the Special
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), reported that “HAMP
borrowers may . . . be worse off than before they participated.” SIGTARP QUARTERLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS 171 (2010), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/
congress/2010/October2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf; see also Jean Braucher,
Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons From the Lackluster First Year of the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727 (2010); Paul Kiel &
Olga Pierce, Homeowner Questionnaire Shows Banks Violating Gov’t Program Rules,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 16, 2010, 8:02 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/homeownerquestionnaire-shows-banks-violating-govt-program-rules.
11. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT:
A REVIEW OF
TREASURY’S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS 95–96 (2010), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf.
12. In late 2009, the foreclosure rate was nearly four times the historic average. CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF FORECLOSURE
MITIGATION
EFFORTS
AFTER
SIX
MONTHS
6
(2009),
available
at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-100909-report.pdf. More than 15% of subprime
mortgages and 24% of subprime adjustable rate mortgages were in foreclosure. Id.
13. See John Eggum, Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in Bankruptcy:
Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1125 (explaining
that the bankruptcy process will not allow many struggling families to keep their homes
because such families “cannot keep up with their ongoing mortgage payments or cannot do
so while curing the defaults on their mortgage loans”); Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the
Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 571
(noting that the bankruptcy system “is incapable of handling the current home-foreclosure
crisis because of the special protection it gives to most residential-mortgage claims”);
Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 121, 176 (2008) (noting, in the context of high and unexpected fees charged by
mortgage holders, that “the amounts of mortgage proofs of claim have direct effects on
bankruptcy’s usefulness as a home-saving device”).
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advantage of Code provisions that give it more than that to which it would
be entitled under state law, that creditor must act in an “honest but
unfortunate” manner. It is well established that debtors must be both honest
and unfortunate to take advantage of bankruptcy’s benefits,14 and many
sections of the Code explicitly reflect that policy. Absent from statements
of bankruptcy policy, however, is the idea that creditors must be honest but
unfortunate in order to receive the full benefits of bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, such a requirement is implicit in the Code’s equitable
subordination provision, § 510(c), which allows a court to subordinate all or
part of a creditor’s claim to other claims using “principles of equitable
subordination.” 15 In this Article, I discuss equitable subordination, a tool
used primarily in business bankruptcy to subordinate the claims of
corporate insiders to the claims of non-insider creditors, and argue that
judges can and should use this tool to modify the claims of home mortgage
creditors who engage in abusive lending practices.
To develop this argument, in Part I I discuss the special treatment of
home mortgagees in Chapter 13 and explain the major changes in lending
practices in the three decades since that special treatment was codified. In
Part II, I explore bankruptcy history to explain how bankruptcy evolved as a
system that punishes undesirable pre-bankruptcy behavior by debtors, while
ignoring such behavior by most creditors. In Part III, I explain equitable
subordination in detail and show that although it has historically been used
to subordinate the claims of corporate insiders, nothing in its history limits
it to that use. In Part IV, I discuss the use of equitable subordination to
subordinate the claims of abusive mortgage lenders and also address some
possible objections to its use. I conclude this Article by urging courts to
both alleviate the current mortgage crisis and discourage reckless lending in
the future by using equitable subordination to modify home mortgage
claims.
I. HOME MORTGAGES AND CHAPTER 13
A. The History of the Anti-Modification Provision
A key component of the bankruptcy reforms in 1978 was Chapter 13 of
the Code, which allows individual debtors to pay off a portion of their debts
while retaining their assets. Chapter 13 was a debtor-friendly alternative to
its predecessor, Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,16 which
required the consent of every secured creditor to every plan of
reorganization. 17 A debtor who wishes to keep her home in bankruptcy
14. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047 n.1 (1987) (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877), as the
first case to state the bankruptcy goal of providing relief to the “honest citizen”).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006).
16. ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
17. See Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1154; Robert M. Zinman & Novica
Petrovski, The Home Mortgage and Chapter 13: An Essay on Unintended Consequences, 17
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 135 (2009).
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would likely file under Chapter 13 because generally a Chapter 13 debtor
keeps all of her property and pays her creditors some portion of their claims
over a three- to-five-year repayment plan. 18
Because home mortgages are typically payable over fifteen to thirty
years, it is unlikely that the typical debtor would be able to pay her
mortgage debt in full in a Chapter 13 plan. Chapter 13 allows such a debtor
to pay her mortgage debt over the term of the original mortgage; if the
debtor has twenty-six years left to pay on her mortgage loan, she can pay
the debt over the remaining twenty-six years of the term. The debtor is also
permitted to cure any pre-bankruptcy payment default by paying all
mortgage arrears during the plan term. 19
Although Chapter 13 gives the homeowner two benefits—the ability to
pay her loan over its original term and the ability to cure defaults—it denies
her a significant benefit that bankruptcy debtors receive with respect to
other loans—loan modification. A Chapter 13 plan can “modify the rights
of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” 20 There is
not much legislative history explaining the reasons for this section, but its
often-stated justification is to preserve the flow of funds into the home
mortgage lending market. 21
This anti-modification provision bestows unusual treatment on home
mortgagees. The Code allows debtors to modify their other creditors’ prebankruptcy deals in several ways. As a general rule, the terms of the
debtor’s Chapter 13 plan replace the terms of her pre-bankruptcy
contracts. 22 For instance, a debtor may propose in her Chapter 13 plan to
pay a creditor a lower interest rate than she was paying under the original
contract, thus reducing the amount of her monthly payments. Most secured
creditors are entitled to the present value of their secured claims, 23 and the

18. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4).
19. Id. § 1322(b)(5) (allowing a debtor to cure defaults and maintain payments on longterm debt).
20. Id. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). For an excellent discussion of the special
treatment of home mortgagees under the Code, see generally Marianne B. Culhane, Home
Improvement? Home Mortgages and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 29 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 467 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Culhane, supra note 20, at 467; Levitin, supra note 13, at 573 n.26 (setting forth
the scant legislative history, which consists of a discussion in a Senate hearing among
Edward J. Kulik of the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, his counsel Robert
E. O’Malley, and Senator Dennis De Concini); Zinman & Petrovski, supra note 17, at 137–
38 (adding that, with its appeal to those who decried “red lining”—the practice of refusing to
make loans in low-income or minority neighborhoods—the anti-modification provision was
also “an experiment in social engineering”).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (stating that the “provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor
and each creditor”); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1327.02[1][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010), available at LexisNexis.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
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U.S. Supreme Court has held that the interest rate in the original loan
contract is not the interest rate used to calculate present value.24
It is often said that bankruptcy preserves state law property rights, 25 and
this is reflected in the Code’s provisions governing claims. Generally, a
secured creditor who is owed more than the value of the collateral securing
its claim must receive in a Chapter 11 or 13 plan at least the present value
of the secured portion of its claim, plus at least the same percentage of its
unsecured claim as it would receive in a Chapter 7 case. 26 The Code thus
bifurcates undersecured claims by giving undersecured creditors two
claims: a secured claim in the amount of the collateral value and an
unsecured claim in the amount by which the outstanding loan amount
exceeds the value of the collateral.27 If a debtor owns a four-year-old car
worth $10,000 on which she owes $15,000, she will be required to pay the
present value of $10,000 in her Chapter 13 plan.28 The remaining $5000
claim will be paid pro-rata with the other non-priority unsecured claims
against her. 29 This full payment of only the secured portion of a secured
lender’s claim is often referred to as “cramdown.” 30 Cramdown reflects a
foreclosure distribution because if the debtor had decided not to file for
bankruptcy but to let the car lender exercise its state law rights, that creditor
would be guaranteed only the value of the collateral. 31
A debtor cannot modify the terms of a home mortgage loan, however.
Therefore, the debtor cannot modify the interest rate or the amount of the
monthly payments. 32 During her plan, she must cure all arrears by paying

24. The Supreme Court has held that the interest rate to be used to pay present value is
the prime rate plus an “appropriate risk adjustment.” Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465,
479 (2004). The loan at issue in Till was a subprime truck loan that carried a 21% interest
rate. Id. at 471.
25. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created
and defined by state law.”).
26. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(5). The 2005 amendments to the Code appear to
bestow special treatment to several other creditors in Chapter 13 under the “hanging
paragraph” to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (stating that § 506, which provides for the bifurcation of
undersecured loans into secured and unsecured claims, does not apply to purchase moneysecured loans obtained within 910 days of the bankruptcy petition to acquire an automobile
for the personal use of the debtor and all secured loans incurred within one year of the
petition). The hanging paragraph prohibits only bifurcation; a debtor may modify such loans
in other ways, such as by lowering the interest rate. See In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269, 273
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
28. Id. § 1325(a)(5). I use a four-year-old car as an example to avoid the application of
the hanging paragraph discussed in note 26, supra.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
30. It is also referred to as “lien stripping” or “strip down.” ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 284–85, 301 (6th ed. 2009).
Another use of the term “cramdown” refers to the Chapter 11 plan that is confirmed over the
objection of a class of creditors or interests. See Adam J. Levitin, Helping Homeowners:
Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 8 n.32 (Jan. 19,
2009), http://www.hlpronline.com/Levitin_HLPR_011909.pdf.
31. See U.C.C. § 9-615(a) (2000).
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (forbidding modification of home mortgages); id.
§ 1322(b)(5) (allowing debtor to cure defaults and maintain payments on long-term debt); id.
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all missed payments, 33 so the plan payments will likely exceed her regular
payments.
Until the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank 34 it was not clear that the prohibition on modifying home
mortgages meant no cramdown. When Congress considered amendments
to the Code in 1991 and 1992 to clarify the anti-modification provision to
specifically allow cramdown, representatives of the lending industry voiced
opposition, claiming that cramdown would reduce lending in lower-income
communities 35 and have a negative effect on the mortgage-backed
securities market. 36
In Nobelman, the Court held that the proscription against modification of
the mortgagee’s rights prohibited not only changes to the interest rate and
payment schedule but also prohibited cramdown. In its opinion, the Court
discussed the rights that a mortgagee holds under a mortgage and noted that
one right of any secured creditor is the right to retain its lien for the full
amount of the debt owed to it until the debt is paid in full. 37 As explained
above, the Code permits debtors to modify this right with respect to most
undersecured creditors. As a result of Nobelman, however, a debtor who
owes $350,000 on a home worth $250,000 will not be able to bifurcate the
lender’s claim into a secured and an unsecured claim. 38 Her entire
$350,000 debt will be treated as a secured claim despite the fact that the
house is worth only $250,000. If she does not pay the $350,000 in full, she
will likely lose her house.
The anti-modification provision gives home mortgage creditors more
than they would receive under state law.39 By requiring the debtor to pay
the home mortgage creditor the full amount outstanding on the loan
regardless of the home’s value, the Code grants a property right that exists
only in bankruptcy. 40 Only the creditor holding the mortgage on the
§ 1328 (excepting long-term debt from discharge). These restrictions on modification also
apply to home mortgages in Chapter 11. Id. § 1123(b)(5).
33. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
34. 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
35. See Veryl Victoria Miles, The Bifurcation of Undersecured Residential Mortgages
Under § 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Final Resolution, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 207,
257–58 (1993) (discussing the Government National Mortgage Association’s (GNMA)
concern that lenders would “perhaps reduce home lending activities to individuals in
communities where the property values are at ‘potential cramdown risk’”).
36. See id. at 266–67 (discussing concerns raised by representatives of the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America).
37. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 329.
38. Id. at 326–27.
39. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
40. In Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1992), the Supreme Court held that
§ 506 of the Code did not allow a debtor to void the undersecured portion of a secured
creditor’s lien, notwithstanding the Code’s statement, in § 506(d) that “to the extent that a
lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is
void.” For detailed critiques of Dewsnup, see generally David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of
Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1996); Margaret Howard,
Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 513 (1992). Notwithstanding
the Dewsnup holding, undersecured creditors are paid only the value of their collateral,
either after foreclosure or at the time a plan of reorganization is confirmed. Chapter 13
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debtor’s principal residence gets this special treatment; a creditor with a
mortgage on a vacation home or on business property does not. 41
Since 2007, Congress has considered at least five bills that would have
allowed home mortgage modification,42 none of which became law. The
bills took several different approaches to mortgage modification, ranging
from a neutral approach that would have allowed modification of all
mortgages, 43 to an approach favoring unfortunate debtors by allowing
modification only if the debtor had insufficient income to make payments,44
to an approach punishing “bad” mortgagees by allowing modification of
only “non-traditional” mortgages. 45 One proposal would have allowed
modification only of those mortgage loans initiated before September
2007. 46 As legislative action to treat home mortgage creditors like other
secured creditors seems unlikely, it is imperative that courts find a way to
deny this special treatment to abusive mortgage lenders.
B. Twenty-First Century Mortgage Lending
Mortgage and other consumer lending today looks little like the lending
of the 1970s, when the Code was enacted. By the beginning of the recent
mortgage crisis, many home loans had such high loan-to-value ratios that
the amount of mortgage debt exceeded the value of the home. 47 The
requires the debtor to make payments equal to the outstanding amount of the loan.
Therefore, the preservation of the home mortgagee’s entire lien by requiring full payment is
the grant of a property right that is non-existent under state law.
41. Courts have held that a debtor who wishes to pay a stripped-down mortgage on
property that is not his primary residence must do so within the statutory Chapter 13 plan
period. Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004).
I address this case in more detail in Part IV, infra.
42. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong.; Helping
Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S. 2136, 110th Cong.; Homeowners
Mortgage and Equity Savings Act, S. 2133, 110th Cong. (2007); Home Owners Mortgage
and Equity Savings Act of 2007, H.R. 3778, 110th Cong.; Emergency Home Ownership and
Mortgage Equity Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. The version of the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 that ultimately passed, Pub. L. 111-22, 123
Stat. 1632 (2009), does not contain a provision allowing modification of home mortgages in
bankruptcy.
43. The version of House Bill 3609 that was introduced in Congress deleted the
prohibition on modification contained in § 1322(b)(2). See Mark Scarberry, Detailed Chart
Comparing Provisions of Current Bankruptcy Bills Dealing With Modification of Home
Mortgages,
as
of
12/13/2007,
AM.
BANKR.
INST.,
available
at
http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/UpdatedMortgageModificationLegislationChart.pdf
[hereinafter Scarberry Chart].
44. S. 2136; see Scarberry Chart, supra note 43.
45. H.R. 3609 (as amended); see Scarberry Chart, supra note 43; Markup of H.R. 3609
and H.R. 3753 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 41 (2007) (statement of
Rep. Brad Sherman, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/transcripts/transcript071212.pdf
(defining
“nontraditional” mortgage loan as one that permits periodic payments that include only the
interest due or that do not include the full amount of interest due).
46. S. 2133; see Scarberry Chart, supra note 43.
47. See Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1158. At the end of the second
quarter of 2010, 23% of all residential properties with mortgages were encumbered by
mortgages that exceeded their value. Press Release, CoreLogic, Negative Equity Report Q2
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abusive practices that contributed to the current financial crisis48 are wellchronicled elsewhere, 49 so this section briefly summarizes these practices
and compares them to traditional lending practices.
In the years preceding the mortgage crisis, new terms, such as
“predatory” and “subprime,” entered the lending lexicon. “Subprime” is a
term that describes both borrowers and loans. Borrowers who have weak
credit histories because of late payments, charge-offs, or bankruptcies, or
who have low credit scores or high debt burdens, fall into the subprime
borrower category. 50 “Predatory” refers to loan terms. Professors Kathleen
Engel and Patricia McCoy concisely define predatory lending as
“exploitative high-cost loans to naïve borrowers.” 51 According to Engel
and McCoy, a loan that is “structured to result in seriously disproportionate
net harm to borrowers” is predatory. 52 The loans often made to subprime
borrowers, with their high fees, low teaser rates of interest, high overall
interest rates, and high loan-to-value ratios, 53 can be considered predatory.
In this Article, I refer to lending practices that tend to decrease the
borrower’s wealth as “abusive” lending practices. 54
There are several key ways in which modern mortgage loans differ from
traditional ones. In the 1930s, the average down payment on a home was
40%. 55 In later years, people considered 20% to be a “standard, moderate
down payment.” 56 By 2006, that down payment had declined to 2% for
2010
(Aug.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.corelogic.com/
uploadedFiles/Pages/About_Us/ResearchTrends/CL_Q2_2010_Negative_Equity_FINAL.pd
f. Nevada had the highest percentage of underwater mortgages, with 68% of its residential
mortgages in negative equity. Id.
48. Even the bankers admit this. See First Public Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry
Comm’n 9 (2010) (testimony of Jamie Dimon, Chairman & CEO, JPMorgan Chase & Co.),
available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0113-Dimon.pdf (stating that “new and
poorly underwritten mortgage products” proved costly for the entire financial system); see
also Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social
Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 299 (2008).
49. See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or Illusion of
Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573 (2009); Brescia, supra note 48; Kurt Eggert, The Great
Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257
(2009); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002); see Alan M. White, The
Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 617 (2008).
50. Brescia, supra note 48, at 287.
51. Engel & McCoy, supra note 49, at 1257.
52. Id. at 1260.
53. Brescia, supra note 48, at 287.
54. I use the term “abusive” because some states have regulated predatory lending and
have defined the regulated loans in varying ways. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l
(McKinney 2008) (regulating “high-cost home loans”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1E
(West 2006) (restricting “high-cost home loan[s]”); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 456.503,
456.511 (West 2010) (prohibiting certain loan terms in mortgage loans less than $100,000).
For purposes of equitable subordination, however, a court’s ability to equitably subordinate a
home mortgage claim should not depend on whether the debtor’s home state has defined that
loan as predatory.
55. Adams, supra note 49, at 601 n.156.
56. Id. at 601–02 (tracing mortgage terms from the 1930s to the present). The average
down payment for repeat homebuyers in 2006 was 16%. Id. at 602.
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first-time homebuyers. 57 One popular loan product was the “80/20 loan”,
which allowed a borrower to obtain both a first mortgage loan for 80% of
the purchase price and a second mortgage loan for 20% of the price, with
the borrower contributing nothing as a down payment. 58
At the time that Chapter 13 was enacted, most home mortgage loans were
made by savings and loan associations and tended to be fixed-rate loans
with 30-year repayment periods.59 The fact that the rates were fixed is
significant because one traditional measure of housing affordability is based
on the relationship between monthly mortgage and other debt payments to
the borrower’s monthly income. 60 When this relationship is calculated on
an adjustable rate loan, a loan that was affordable at its inception becomes
unaffordable when the rate resets.61
Adjustable rate mortgage loans have proliferated in recent years. These
loans carry a low fixed introductory rate and then reset to an adjustable rate
of interest after the expiration of the introductory period. According to one
estimate, nearly 75% of all securitized subprime mortgage loans originated
in 2004 and 2005 carried a low fixed teaser rate for two or three years.62
These adjustable rate loans gave the appearance of affordability because the
borrowers’ ability to pay the loans was determined using the teaser rate, but
such affordability was often lost when the rate reset. 63 Although the teaser
rate was a lower rate than the ultimate interest rate, subprime loans carried
higher rates of interest than prime loans. According to one study, there is a
two percentage point difference between the highest interest rate on prime
loans and the lowest rate on subprime loans. 64
Traditionally, mortgage loans were amortized over a thirty year period.
Therefore, monthly payments on these loans included interest and an
increasing amount of principal, enabling the homeowner to slowly build
equity even in the absence of appreciation.65 In recent years, however,
57. Id.
58. Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How Did It Happen and How
Will It End?, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2007, at 13, 15.
59. Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1156.
60. See Adams, supra note 49, at 579–80 (citing the widely used 28/36 rule, under
which monthly mortgage payments are affordable if they make up no more than 28% of the
borrower’s gross income, and if mortgage payments, combined with all other debt payments,
make up no more than 36% of the borrower’s gross income).
61. For this reason, Professor Kristen Adams suggests that more attention be paid to
another traditional measure of affordability, the relationship of home purchase price to
family income. Under that measure, a home is affordable if it costs no more than 2.5 times
family income. Id. at 584.
62. On Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures, Before the Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/htbair041707.pdf.
63. See Eggert, supra note 49, at 1291; Krinsman, supra note 58, at 14–15.
64. R. Stephen Painter Jr., Subprime Lending, Suboptimal Bankruptcy: A Proposal to
Amend §§ 522(f)(1)(B) and 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code to Protect Subprime
Mortgage Borrowers and Their Unsecured Creditors, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81, 89 (2006).
65. See REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 3E.02[1] (Matthew Bender 2010), available at
LexisNexis (describing an alternative mortgage transaction as any mortgage that does not
conform to the “traditional fully amortized, fixed interest rate mortgage loan” (citing First
Gibraltar Bank, F.S.B. v. Morales, 19 F.3d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1994))).
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many borrowers took out interest-only loans. Borrowers with interest-only
loans are required to make monthly payments of interest only (as the name
implies) for the first few years of the loan term. After that period, the loan
“resets” to an amortizing loan with higher monthly payments including both
interest and principal. 66 Because it was unlikely that borrowers would be
able to afford payments after the loan converted to an amortizing loan,
lenders relied on the borrower’s ability to sell the home for at least the loan
amount, or alternatively to refinance the loan.67
Even more onerous than the interest-only loan was the option adjustable
rate mortgage, or “Option ARM.” The Option ARM allowed the borrower
a choice of monthly payments ranging from payments that would amortize
the loan over fifteen years on the high end to payments that would not be
sufficient to pay the monthly interest on the loan at the low end. 68 These
loans, originally intended for sophisticated investors and persons who
expected an increase in income, were often offered to homebuyers who
could be described as “average.” 69 Instead of enabling borrowers to build
wealth, negative amortization loans deplete home equity and therefore harm
the debtor’s other creditors because the shortfall in interest is added to the
outstanding principal of the loan.70
Another major development in mortgage lending was the reduced
documentation of a borrower’s income and assets. Traditionally, borrowers
were required to provide full documentation of their financial condition, but
banks would sometimes excuse borrowers who were self-employed
professionals from the obligation to provide full financial documentation.
In recent years, subprime and first-time borrowers were offered these noand low-documentation loans. 71 According to one estimate, 46% of all
subprime mortgage loans in 2006 were no-documentation loans.72
Abusive loans often carry high fees. It is estimated that the fees on
subprime loans are six times greater than those on prime loans. 73 Subprime
lenders often charged above-market prices for credit reports and document
preparation and sometimes charged for services that were never provided.74
Because cash-poor subprime borrowers were often unable to pay these fees
upfront, lenders included these high fees in the amount financed, thus

66. Interest-only loans were rare until recently. In 2004, almost half of all homebuyers
in California used an interest-only loan to purchase their homes. David Streitfeld, The House
Trap: As an Exotic Mortgage Resets, Payments Skyrocket, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at B1.
67. See Adams, supra note 49, at 606.
68. See, e.g., Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1159; John Leland, Loans
That Looked Easy Pose Threats to Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at A12.
69. See Leland, supra note 68.
70. See Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1159–60 (explaining that a
borrower with a negative amortization loan will not build equity in her home); Painter, supra
note 64, at 94 (explaining negative amortization loans).
71. See Eggert, supra note 49, at 1285; Krinsman, supra note 58, at 15.
72. See White, supra note 49, at 634.
73. Painter, supra note 64, at 93.
74. Engel & McCoy, supra note 49, at 1266.
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further decreasing the homeowner’s chance of building equity in the
home. 75
A major factor contributing to the proliferation of questionable
mortgages was securitization. Mortgage brokers and originators were
rewarded for quantity, not quality: the more loans made, the more money
for the originator. 76 Securitization fueled some of the abusive practices
described above; for instance, low documentation loans enabled originators
to hide the true riskiness of a loan. 77 In addition, securitization also led to
the overappraisals that contributed to high loan-to-value ratios. In the
securitization market, loan originators had an incentive to overappraise so
that the loan-to-value ratios on the loans they sold would look more
attractive. 78
Home mortgagees were given special protections in 1978 to preserve the
flow of funds into the home mortgage lending market. 79 When discussing
whether this policy requires that today’s subprime lenders receive that same
protection, it is important to consider the purposes for which many
subprime loans were made. Most subprime mortgage loans were not used
by first-time homebuyers, nor were they used to purchase a home at all;
rather, they were used to refinance an existing loan.80 Because a portion of
most refinance loans is used to pay for non-housing related items, these
loans are only loosely related to any policy of encouraging
homeownership. 81
With their high rates of interest, high fees, and high loan-to-value ratios,
these abusive loan products prevented homeowners from building equity in
their homes. Moreover, lax underwriting standards led banks to lend
money to borrowers who had little ability to repay without refinancing or
selling their homes. 82 The debtors/homeowners are not the only ones
harmed by these abusive practices. By depleting the debtor’s assets and
hindering his ability to build wealth, these abusive lending practices harmed
the debtor’s other creditors as well.
Congress prohibited the modification of home mortgages in 1978 and the
Supreme Court interpreted this prohibition to give mortgage lenders full
payment regardless of home value in 1993. 83 It strains belief to think that
Congress and the Court intended that lenders that engage in abusive lending
practices be entitled to these protections. Requiring home mortgagees to

75. Painter, supra note 64, at 92.
76. Krinsman, supra note 58, at 13–14.
77. Eggert, supra note 49, at 1286.
78. Id. at 1287.
79. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
80. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner
Dilemma, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 25 (2004); White, supra note 49, at 621.
81. In fact, a good argument can be made that subprime lending has reduced
homeownership because from 1998 to 2006, “the number of completed subprime mortgage
foreclosures exceeded the number of first-time homebuyers who used a subprime mortgage.”
White, supra note 49, at 622.
82. See Eggert, supra note 49, at 1268–70.
83. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
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come to bankruptcy court as honest but unfortunate creditors would reserve
Chapter 13’s favorable treatment to those lenders whose loans assist
homebuyers in achieving the desirable status of homeowner.
II. HONEST BUT UNFORTUNATE DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
Both debtors and creditors come to bankruptcy court to ask for something
that they would not receive under non-bankruptcy law. A debtor comes to
court looking to discharge pre-petition debts 84 and also wants the court to
stay collection actions against him. 85 These requests invoke a major
bankruptcy policy: relief for the honest but unfortunate debtor. The Code’s
rules reflect this policy, and only a debtor who plays by the Code’s rules
governing his behavior both before his bankruptcy filing and during the
bankruptcy case is eligible for this relief.
Creditors also come to court seeking favors. Unsecured creditors want to
stop the race to collect from the debtor in order to preserve some chance of
recovery. 86 They seek the full benefit of the automatic stay, which, by
halting all collection efforts against the debtor and the debtor’s property,
ensures that all creditors have a chance at the debtor’s assets. They also
want to make sure that their claims are afforded appropriate priority.87
These requests invoke another policy, that of the equal treatment of
similarly situated creditors. Creditors are also required to play by the
Code’s rules, but these rules focus on creditor behavior affecting the
administration of the bankruptcy case rather than on their behavior in their
pre-bankruptcy relationships with borrowers.
Undersecured home mortgagees come to bankruptcy court looking for a
big favor: they ask the court to give them greater protection than that
provided under state law. To receive such special treatment, the home
mortgage creditor’s pre-bankruptcy behavior should be carefully
scrutinized. Yet there is no explicit policy of requiring creditors to be
honest but unfortunate to receive bankruptcy’s benefits.
The Code contains rules governing debtor and creditor behavior. The
rules can be characterized as either administrative or moral, with
administrative rules punishing actions during the bankruptcy case that
hinder the administration of the case and the moral rules punishing
primarily pre-bankruptcy behavior that we consider to violate some
standard of acceptable conduct. The Code’s sections are explicit in
requiring both administrative and moral compliance from the debtor, thus
granting relief only to the “honest but unfortunate” debtor. At first glance,
however, it seems that any requirement that a creditor behave in a
prescribed manner is primarily based on administrative factors. Thus, the
Code does not appear to embody any policy of affording relief only to

84. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (excepting listed debts of individuals from discharge).
85. Id. § 362(a) (stating that all collection efforts against the debtor and its property must
cease upon a bankruptcy filing).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 507.
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honest but unfortunate creditors. While hundreds of articles about
bankruptcy law refer to the “honest but unfortunate debtor,” 88 not one in
either the Lexis or HeinOnline databases contains the phrase “honest but
unfortunate creditor.” 89
Historically, bankruptcy has included a “bad debtor” story. The Code’s
rules governing debtor behavior reflect this story.
There is no
corresponding general “bad creditor” story, however, and the Code’s rules
regarding creditor behavior reflect this absence. There are two Code
sections that allow a court to take a creditor’s pre-bankruptcy dealings with
the debtor into account, however: § 522(f), which allows the debtor to
avoid non-purchase money, non-possessory security interests in enumerated
household goods and § 510(c), which gives the court the power to equitably
subordinate the claims of creditors who engage in inequitable behavior that
harms other creditors. The first sets forth a narrow rule that punishes a
specific type of undesirable lender behavior, but the second could allow a
court to deny full bankruptcy relief to creditors who engage in a wide range
of questionable behavior.
A. Ensuring That Debtors Are Both Honest and Unfortunate
Bankruptcy law grants relief to the honest but unfortunate debtor.
Although this statement was first found in American case law in the late
1800s, 90 even the earliest bankruptcy laws distinguished between honest
and dishonest debtors. In ancient times and in the early United States,
insolvency for all reasons, honest and dishonest, was considered to be the
result of moral failure or some kind of malfeasance.91 Early bankruptcy
laws therefore were punitive because persons who failed to pay their debts
were viewed as wrongdoers, even criminals.
Despite this generally-held view of debtors as bad actors, early debtorcreditor laws distinguished debtors rendered insolvent by misfortune from
those rendered insolvent by bad acts. Insolvency laws throughout history
have punished dishonest debtors more severely than honest ones, an
important distinction when the punishment for dishonest debtors could be

88. A very unscientific search found 355 articles (including student comments and
notes) in the Lexis U.S. Law Reviews and Journals database that mentioned “honest but
unfortunate debtor” at least once, LEXIS TOTAL RESEARCH SYSTEM, www.lexis.com (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011), and 431 articles (including student articles and notes) in the
HeinOnline Core U.S. Journals that contained the same phrase, HEINONLINE,
www.heinonline.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
89. A search of “honest but unfortunate creditor” on January 23, 2011 found no articles
on either HeinOnline or Lexis.
90. See Howard, supra note 14, at 1047 & n.1 (tracing the use of a similar statement to
Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877)).
91. See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 2–3 (2002) (describing views on insolvency in the early United
States); Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV.
223, 237 (1917) (describing the ancient view of insolvency as something “irregular and
fraudulent”); Painter, supra note 64, at 103.
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imprisonment, 92 slavery, 93 or even capital punishment. 94 Better treatment
for unfortunate debtors did not mean discharge, however, because early
debtor-creditor law granted no forgiveness to debtors. 95
Discharge became part of debtor-creditor laws because courts need
accurate information about a debtor’s financial affairs in order to administer
a bankruptcy case. The original idea behind discharge, which became part
of English bankruptcy law in the early 1700s, was to encourage the debtor’s
cooperation in the dismantling of his own financial affairs because the
debtor was in a better position than his creditors to know his financial
condition and transactions. 96 Likewise, the earliest American federal
bankruptcy law denied relief to those who withheld assets or information.97
Therefore, honesty during the bankruptcy case was required of debtors for
administrative reasons.
The Code’s discharge provisions illustrate this administrative component
of the honest but unfortunate debtor. The Code allows a court to deny
discharge to the debtor who does not keep adequate books and records of
her pre-bankruptcy transactions, 98 the debtor who makes a false oath in
connection with the case, 99 and the debtor who withholds information about
her finances from the trustee or the court.100 All of these debtors are
punished severely for taking actions that impede a fair distribution of assets
to creditors, as a discharge denial means that they will be denied bankruptcy
relief and will emerge from bankruptcy liable for all of their pre-petition
debts. Discharge denial in this context furthers the original purpose of the
discharge: to encourage debtor cooperation.101
Remnants of the old view of debt as the product of moral failure can still
be found in the Code’s debtor conduct requirements. Debtors are punished
not only for financial misconduct but also for some types of non-financial
misconduct. The Code punishes financial misconduct by allowing a court
to deny discharge to a debtor who made fraudulent transfers in anticipation

92. See Levinthal, supra note 91, at 238 (explaining the Roman cessio bonorum, a
voluntary composition with creditors which allowed an “innocent insolvent” to avoid arrest
and imprisonment).
93. See MANN, supra note 91, at 65 (explaining that many American colonies permitted
insolvent debtors to be forced into servitude to their creditors for as long as seven years);
Levinthal, supra note 91, at 230, 237–38 (discussing the treatment of insolvent debtors by
the Code of Hammurabi and in ancient Rome).
94. See Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the
Development of Bankruptcy Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1261–65 (2010) (describing the Act of
4 & 5 Anne, which made fraudulent bankruptcy a capital offense).
95. See MANN, supra note 91, at 2–3.
96. See Howard, supra note 14, at 1049; Kadens, supra note 94, at 1269–70 (discussing
discharge and capital punishment as two methods by which the debtor’s cooperation was
encouraged in early English bankruptcy law).
97. See MANN, supra note 91, at 223.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (2006) (denying discharge to a debtor who has failed to keep
or preserve any recorded information from which her financial condition can be ascertained).
99. Id. § 727(a)(4)(A).
100. Id. § 727(a)(4)(D).
101. See Howard, supra note 14, at 1053.
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of bankruptcy. 102 That debtor did not hinder the administration of the
estate, rather, she depleted it before bankruptcy. This conduct can be
punished under state law, 103 but the Code provides for a harsher
punishment: no bankruptcy relief. 104 A debtor’s morally objectionable
financial misconduct can also result in non-dischargeable debts. Many of
the “rifle shot” exceptions, which except individual claims from discharge,
are based on bad debtor financial behavior in the claim’s creation. For
instance, the Code excepts from discharge debts obtained by “false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” 105 This provision allows
credit card companies to contest the discharge of charges that were made by
a debtor who, at the time she used her card, either had no intention to pay
the charges or knew that she “would be unable to live up to the obligation
and pay the charges.” 106 A claim arising out of the debtor’s fraud while
acting in a fiduciary capacity is likewise non-dischargeable. 107
Several non-dischargeable debts are unrelated to financial misconduct,
however. For example, debts for “willful and malicious injury” to another
person or to the property of another person108 and debts for death or
personal injury caused by the debtor’s drunk driving 109 are nondischargeable. These exceptions, while not punishing pre-bankruptcy
financial dishonesty, reflect the view that there is some bad behavior that
renders a debtor unworthy of bankruptcy relief. 110
In short, debtors have long been required to be “honest but unfortunate”
in order to receive the benefits of bankruptcy for two reasons: the court
needed the cooperation of the debtors in the bankruptcy case and debtors
were the “bad guys.” Although bankruptcy law is no longer based on the
view that debtors are undeserving merely because they are in financial
distress, 111 bankruptcy relief remains reserved for those debtors who deal

102. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (denying a discharge to a debtor who, within one year of the
bankruptcy petition, transfers property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor);
see In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 988–89 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying discharge to a debtor who
had transferred about $35,000 of non-exempt property to pay down a mortgage on his
exempt homestead).
103. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 155–56 (2006).
104. See supra notes 95, 99–102 and accompanying text.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
106. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. v. Dorsey (In re Dorsey), 120 B.R. 592,
596 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). The facts in Dorsey show some questionable behavior on the
part of both the debtor and the credit card company. The debtor, who had not been
employed in the decade before she filed for bankruptcy and who lived on $480 a month in
Social Security payments, managed to charge over $100,000 on seven American Express
cards. Id. at 593–94. She paid only the minimum amounts due each month under the
American Express “Travel & Sign” program. Id. at 594–95. After American Express argued
that $50,000 of its claim should be excepted from discharge, the court held that about
$25,000 of her debt to American Express was non-dischargeable. See id. at 593–97.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
108. Id. § 523(a)(6).
109. Id. § 523(a)(9).
110. See Howard, supra note 14, at 1052–53.
111. See id. at 1052. But see Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 385 (2008) (referring to the
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honestly with the court and who behave in a morally acceptable manner
before filing for bankruptcy.
B. Code Provisions Designed To Ensure Good Creditor Behavior
At first glance, the Code does not appear to require that creditors also be
“honest but unfortunate” to take advantage of bankruptcy’s benefits. The
American respect for freedom of contract in both consumer 112 and
business 113 transactions may be one reason why there is not a pervasive
bankruptcy story line of the dishonest creditor. In cases in which a creditor
arguably acted negligently, it is often the case that the debtor’s behavior is
seen as worse. Cases involving credit card debt are good examples of this,
with courts balancing imprudent extensions of credit against the behavior of
debtors who may have borrowed money that they had no intention of
repaying. 114 Stories of credit card companies that distributed pre-approved
cards without inquiring into the creditworthiness of the individual receiving
the card 115 are often drowned out by stories of debtors who borrowed
money far in excess of their ability to pay and used bankruptcy to escape
their obligations. 116 As a result, bankruptcy law has not been influenced by
an often-repeated “bad creditor” story.
The idea that creditors do not act in morally objectionable ways is
reflected in the Code provisions that deny creditors the full benefit of
bankruptcy. These provisions primarily punish administrative misconduct.
For example, a creditor who receives timely notice of the debtor’s petition
but nevertheless files a late proof of claim will find its claim subordinated
to all other unsecured claims. 117 This is an administrative rule that
punishes a creditor whose failure to act hinders the orderly distribution of
the debtor’s assets.
When creditors are punished for their pre-bankruptcy actions, they are
punished for administrative, not moral, reasons. The trustee’s power to

media debates preceding the adoption of the 2005 amendments to the Code, which portrayed
debtors as “deadbeats who abused the system”).
112. Other countries are more aggressive about policing consumer loan contracts. See
John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
405, 421–22 (explaining foreign laws that place special responsibilities on lenders).
113. One example of a failed attempt to impose an “honest but unfortunate” standard on
creditors can be found in the 1980s lender liability litigation boom. These suits tended to fail
as they were brought by sophisticated parties against their lenders. The reported cases favor
the lenders in these cases by a margin of three to one. A. Brooke Overby, Bondage,
Domination and the Art of the Deal: An Assessment of Judicial Strategies in Lender
Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 966 (1993).
114. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
115. See Margaret Howard, Shifting Risk and Fixing Blame: The Vexing Problem of
Credit Card Obligations in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 143 (2001) (suggesting that
“the bankruptcy system has a legitimate stake in requiring the card issuer to show that
prudent lending practices were followed”).
116. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News
Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1097 (2004) (discussing media reports of abuse of easy
credit and permissive bankruptcy laws).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(3) (2006).
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avoid preferential transfers 118 is an example of such an administrative
punishment. Any secured creditor who perfects its interest within ninety
days before the bankruptcy filing and who would improve its position in
bankruptcy by doing so stands to have its security interest avoided.119 This
is a harsh punishment, as a valid state law property right is set aside because
it was obtained too close in time to the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. Secured
parties are punished both for the innocent failure to perfect their interests
until the eve of bankruptcy and for knowing attempts to improve their
positions on the eve of bankruptcy. This avoiding power protects the
common pool and furthers the policy of equal treatment of creditors. While
the trustee might be punishing “dishonest” creditor behavior by exercising
the power to avoid preferential transfers, the undesirable creditor behavior
is related more closely to the imminent bankruptcy case than to the initial
lending transaction. Therefore, this rule is purely administrative because it
equally punishes both innocent and culpable behavior.
Sometimes, bankruptcy law favors creditors for their moral worthiness.
Bankruptcy treats some creditors more harshly than others when one
creditor is paid a smaller percentage of its claim than another. When types
of debts are singled out in bankruptcy, it is because they are more deserving
rather than less deserving. 120 Priority creditors include those with claims
The
for taxes, 121 wages, 122 and spousal and child support. 123
dischargeability provisions also incorporate the idea of creditor worthiness,
by including taxes, 124 spousal and child support claims, 125 and student
loans 126 on the list of non-dischargeable debts. Even these provisions
straddle a line between punishing a debtor for dishonest behavior and
rewarding a particularly deserving creditor. 127 Bankruptcy law today

118. Id. § 547.
119. Creditors are also punished for receiving payments within the ninety day preference
period. See id. § 547(b) (the trustee can avoid transfers of an interest of the debtor in any
property if it satisfies the requirements of a voidable preference).
120. Others have noticed this discrepancy as well. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 14, at
1050–59 (noting that the exceptions from discharge for tax claims and support claims are
based not on the debtor’s behavior, but on a belief that the creditors owed these claims are
more worthy than other creditors); Philip Schuchman, An Attempt at a “Philosophy of
Bankruptcy”, 21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 432 (1973) (“We assert that every debt is like every
other debt unless the law declares it to be different (as in the case of taxes and secured
creditors).”).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
122. Id. § 507(a)(4).
123. Id. § 507(a)(1).
124. Id. § 523(a)(1).
125. Id. § 523(a)(5).
126. Id. § 523(a)(8). This exception has an undue hardship exception, designed to assure
that a debtor who tries to discharge a student loan obligation is truly unfortunate. This undue
hardship exception is rarely granted. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue
Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of
Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405 (2005).
127. For instance, someone who files for bankruptcy with outstanding student loan debt
could be classified as “dishonest” because the student loan allowed her to amass human
capital. Howard, supra note 14, at 1085–86.
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rewards creditors whose claims are seen as more worthy, but in only rare
instances are less-worthy creditors punished.
Viewed in the most positive light, home mortgage creditors in 1978 were
seen as worthy creditors because their loans furthered the desirable goal of
homeownership, and Congress rewarded them with protection from
modification of their claims. While one way to view this special treatment
is as a mere gift from Congress to banks, 128 the beneficiaries of the special
treatment warned that cutting off the flow of mortgage credit would harm
those who had the hardest time achieving the American dream of
homeownership, particularly those in minority groups. 129 Congress treated
the entire class of home mortgagees as worthy creditors and made no
exception in the Code for home mortgagees who acted in a morally
objectionable manner.
Despite the fact that bankruptcy law contains bankruptcy-specific
punishments for morally objectionable debtor behavior, it yields to state and
other federal law to punish morally objectionable creditor behavior. If a
creditor would be denied recovery under state law because the debtor can
claim a defense such as illegality or unconscionability, that creditor’s claim
will not be allowed in bankruptcy. 130 This rule is not a special bankruptcy
rule; it merely recognizes that a creditor who does not have a valid claim
outside of bankruptcy does not have a claim in bankruptcy.
If an abusive loan contract is enforceable under non-bankruptcy law, the
lender’s claim will be allowed in bankruptcy. 131 In 1975 Professor Vern
Countryman, concerned about the explosion in consumer credit at that time,
suggested changes to non-bankruptcy law that would render the claims of
abusive lenders unenforceable both in and out of bankruptcy. 132 Recently,
128. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1695, 1710 (2004) (“Mortgage lenders insisted that the [antimodification] provisions were more than simply a valentine from Congress . . . .”); Zinman
& Petrovski, supra note 17, at 136 (describing the political climate in 1978 and opining that
then-President Jimmy Carter and the Democrats in Congress were “not people who would
normally be pictured as being involved in a cabal with lenders against homeowners”).
129. See Miles, supra note 35, at 257–58 (discussing the argument made by GNMA
during the hearings on the 1994 amendments to the Code that lenders would “perhaps reduce
home lending activities to individuals in communities where the property values are at
‘potential cramdown risk’”); Skeel, supra note 128, at 1711 (discussing the argument by the
lending community that the protection of home mortgages would “ensure a steady stream of
affordable financing to ordinary Americans who wished to buy their own homes”); Zinman
& Petrovski, supra note 17, at 137–38 (noting that the argument that allowing modification
of home mortgages would restrict credit in harmful ways “obviously struck a chord with
those who decried ‘red lining’”).
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (stating that a creditor’s claim will be disallowed to the
extent that “such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under
any . . . applicable law”); Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156,
161 (1946) (“What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the
bankrupt at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of
overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law.”).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1).
132. Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?,
27 ME. L. REV. 1 (1975). More recently, in response to today’s credit crisis, John Pottow has
suggested that courts recognize a cause of action for “reckless lending.” Pottow, supra note
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state courts have found ways to deny abusive home mortgage creditors
foreclosure relief. 133 In the absence of non-bankruptcy law punishing
abusive creditors, however, those creditors will be treated like all others in
bankruptcy. If they are home mortgage creditors, they will receive
favorable bankruptcy treatment.
In only two sections does the Code punish objectionable creditor
behavior in the transaction creating the claim against the debtor. The first,
§ 522(f), is very narrow. Applicable only in consumer bankruptcy cases,
this section allows an individual debtor to avoid a security interest if it is a
non-possessory, non-purchase money security interest in exempt household
goods, tools of the debtor’s trade, or professionally prescribed health
aids. 134 The second, § 510(c), is the equitable subordination provision,
which appears to be narrow because it has been used primarily to
subordinate the claims of a debtor’s corporate insiders. 135
Section 522(f) is a unique section in the Code in that it explicitly
punishes lending practices that are considered predatory. This section was
designed to deter the practice of taking low value personal items as
collateral for a loan other than a loan that enabled the debtor to purchase
those items. A creditor who takes household furniture and other household
items as collateral for a loan is likely doing so not because such items have
great foreclosure value, but because such items have great leverage
value. 136 Unsecured creditors enforcing judgment liens cannot reach these

112, at 420. Pottow analogizes creditors who extend credit knowing that the debtor will not
be able to pay to debtors who accumulate credit card debt by purchasing luxury goods
immediately before bankruptcy. Id. Creditors who would be punished under Pottow’s
proposal are those who “know, or are reckless to the likelihood, that the debtor has no
realistic prospect of repaying his loan within a reasonable period of time.” Id. at 463. Alan
White has urged an outright ban on subprime lending. White, supra note 49.
133. In Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, a New York court cancelled the mortgage
indebtedness owing to a creditor who had acted abusively after the debtor’s default by not
pursuing loan modification in good faith. 890 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 2009). The court
described the mortgage at issue as “‘sub-prime’ or ‘high cost’ in nature.” Id. at 315. The
same judge barred another subprime mortgage creditor from collecting interest on the loan
after the date of default as well as legal fees and expenses because of its lack of good faith in
its post-default modification negotiations. Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Corcione, 900 N.Y.S.2d
608 (Sup. Ct. 2010). In addition, the Massachusetts Attorney General has successfully
brought enforcement actions under state consumer protection law to force subprime lenders
to work with the Attorney General’s office to restructure certain subprime loans before
pursuing foreclosure. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548
(Mass. 2008).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
135. Id. § 510(c).
136. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 30, at 194–95 (explaining that § 522(f) “was
adopted largely in response to a growing concern about the use of security interests by
certain finance companies to prey on the poor” and that the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) promulgated its rule to “limit any special incentive to file bankruptcy”). Today, nonpurchase money loans secured by household goods are rare because after Congress enacted
§ 522(f) as part of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, the FTC promulgated a rule under which a
non-possessory, non-purchase money loan secured by certain personal items is considered an
unfair trade practice. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2010). The FTC rule is
based on § 522(f). See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing Liens Under Bankruptcy
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low value household items in many states because of state exemption
laws. 137 Exemption laws, however, do not affect the rights of secured
creditors. 138 The avoidance provision in § 522(f) therefore preserves the
debtor’s “fresh start” by allowing her to keep property that would be
exempt but for the debtor’s grant of a security interest in an undesirable
lending transaction. One author has suggested extending this protection to
debtors harmed by abusive home mortgage practices by allowing such
debtors to avoid a subprime mortgage lien. 139
By authorizing a court to subordinate all or part of an allowed claim to
another allowed claim using “principles of equitable subordination,”
§ 510(c) of the Code permits courts to deny relief to creditors who are not
honest but unfortunate. 140 A court thus has the ability to punish a creditor
for morally objectionable pre-bankruptcy behavior. While the practical
result of equitable subordination is often nonpayment of the subordinated
claim, legally the claim is allowed, but pushed to the end of the distribution
line. 141 The most common use of this power is to subordinate claims of
corporate insiders, 142 but nowhere is the power limited to insider claims.
Therefore, equitable subordination may be appropriate when the creditor’s
claim is enforceable under non-bankruptcy law but the creditor’s conduct
begs an equitable remedy. 143
Because home mortgage creditors come to bankruptcy court seeking a
favor, bankruptcy law can and should intervene to determine whether the
home mortgage creditor is worthy of its special bankruptcy remedy. 144 The
home mortgage creditor is given a “super-priority” in that its entire claim,
supported by collateral or not, is treated as secured, and thus entitled to full
payment, and its original loan terms are enforced. This super-priority may
originally have been granted based on the worthiness of home mortgage
lenders, but today’s lending practices have introduced some particularly
unworthy creditors.
A court using its equitable subordination power could strip down home
mortgages so that the lender’s allowed secured claim would be equal to the
Code Section 522(f): One Step Forward and One Step Back, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 8 n.32
(1999).
137. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 815.18 (West 2007).
138. See, e.g., id. §§ 815.18(2)(h), (12).
139. See generally Painter, supra note 64.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c).
141. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, ¶ 510.05.
142. David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable
Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 199 (2003); see also Woods v. City Nat’l Bank
& Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 269–70 (1941) (denying compensation to a mortgage
bondholders’ committee under the Bankruptcy Act because of undisclosed conflicts of
interest involving committee members who were employees of one of the underwriters of the
bonds who in turn had an equity interest in the mortgaged property); Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 303–09 (1939) (subordinating salary claims of a corporate officer that were not
enforced until the company was in financial difficulty).
143. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, ¶ 510.02.
144. See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (explaining
that “equitable scrutiny attaches” when a creditor asks for “affirmative aid of the bankruptcy
court to secure its preferred position in the bankruptcy”).
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market value of the home. The lender would then be entitled to an
unsecured claim in the amount by which the outstanding loan exceeds the
value of the home. A court using this power could also reduce the interest
rate on the loan. In the remainder of this Article, I explain equitable
subordination in detail and discuss why it is well suited to remedying the
harms caused by creative lending practices.
III. EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION
A. A Brief History of Equitable Subordination in Bankruptcy
The courts’ power to equitably subordinate claims was made explicit
when Congress passed the Code in 1978. Congress intended, in including
an equitable subordination provision in the Code, that courts would both
rely on pre-existing case law and continue to develop standards for
equitable subordination. 145 The recent proliferation of abusive lending
practices that are currently protected by the Code’s anti-modification
provision gives bankruptcy courts an ideal opportunity to identify and
remedy inequitable conduct in home mortgage lending transactions.
The Code’s predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act) contained
no specific equitable subordination provision. Because the Act contained
no specific equitable subordination provision, courts deciding cases under
the Act found their power to subordinate claims in the Act’s grant to courts
of “such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings.” 146 This grant led many
courts to describe bankruptcy courts as courts of equity. 147 Broadly, courts
interpreted the Act as requiring them to use the rules and principles of
equity jurisprudence in adjudicating the rights of the parties involved in a
bankruptcy case. 148 Historically, the equity system treated access to its
remedies as a privilege, not a right. 149 This equitable principle is clear in
the discharge provisions of the Code, which grant relief only to wellbehaved debtors. Another hallmark of equity is that it is “flexible rather
145. See Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators), 926 F.2d
1458, 1464 (5th Cir. 1991); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, ¶ 510.05 (citing to
legislative history); Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable
Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW. 417, 421 (1985).
146. Pepper, 308 U.S at 304 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934)).
147. See, e.g., Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946) (stating that “[i]t is true that
a bankruptcy court is also a court of equity”); Pepper, 308 U.S. at 304 (noting the Act’s
grant of equity jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts); Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 240 (“Courts of
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in
equity.”); Larson v. First State Bank of Vienna, S.D., (In re Eggen) 21 F.2d 936, 938 (8th
Cir. 1927) (stating that “[a] court of bankruptcy is a court of equity”). But see Alan M.
Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court, Not
a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 11 (2005) (explaining that while bankruptcy courts
are not courts of equity, bankruptcy judges have specific equitable powers conferred by
statute); Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”: What Does That
Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 310 (1999) (discussing the history of equity and bankruptcy and
concluding that bankruptcy courts are not courts of equity).
148. Larson, 21 F.2d at 938.
149. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 57 (Practitioner Treatise Series 2d ed. 1993).
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than rigid, its interest justice rather than law.”150 Courts that equitably
subordinate claims apply these equitable principles to creditor behavior.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Pepper v. Litton 151 provides the classic
example of an individual claim subordinated because of creditor
misconduct. In that case, a corporate insider, described as the “dominant
and controlling stockholder” of the debtor corporation, had caused the
corporation to confess a judgment on salary claims due to him while
another creditor’s lawsuit was pending. 152 In subordinating the insider’s
claim to the claims of the general unsecured creditors, the Court construed
the Act’s grant of equity jurisdiction to allow it to “sift the circumstances
surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in
administration of the bankrupt estate.” 153
While creditor misconduct is a necessary element of an equitable
subordination claim, the injustice or unfairness required by Pepper is
unfairness in the distribution results, not unfairness to the debtor. Courts
find unjust or unfair results when the conduct of one creditor negatively
affects the claim position of another creditor. 154 A good example of this is
found in Miller v. Borton (In re Bowman Hardware & Electric Co.),155 in
which a non-insider creditor, Miller, insisted that the debtor keep the loan
arrangement between them secret. A second creditor, Van Camp, made a
loan to the debtor, relying on the debtor’s false statements about its
financial condition.156 The court found that because Miller induced the
debtor’s misstatements, Miller’s claim should be subordinated to the claim
of Van Camp. 157 In subordinating the claim, the court cited the general rule
of equity that “he who has done iniquity shall not have equity,”158 and
listed three categories of acts that could deprive a creditor of equal
treatment: those involving moral turpitude, those involving breach of duty,
and misrepresentations that deceive other creditors to their detriment. 159
Courts view their ability to equitably subordinate claims as primarily
remedial, not punitive. Only a creditor or the trustee, but not the debtor, has
Equitable
standing to bring an equitable subordination claim. 160
subordination gives a court the power to remedy injustices that would result

150. Id. at 63.
151. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
152. Id. at 296–97.
153. Id. at 307–08; see also Bostian v. Schapiro (In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co.), 144
F.2d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 1944) (describing equitable subordination as “an exercise of the
court’s general power under the statute to adjust equities among creditors in relation to the
liquidation results”).
154. Bostian, 144 F.2d at 800.
155. 67 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1933).
156. Id. at 795.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 794.
159. Id.
160. Balcor/Morristown P’ship v. Vector Whippany Assocs., 181 B.R. 781, 791 (D.N.J.
1995); Weeks v. Kinslow (In re Weeks), 28 B.R. 958, 960 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983).
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from allowing a claim to its full extent with its statutory priority. 161 In one
early case, the court described its equitable subordination power as the
authority to “go no farther than to level off actual inequitable disparities on
the bankruptcy terrain for which a creditor is responsible.” 162 The end
result of equitable subordination is not recovery for wrongdoing, but rather
removal of any disadvantage in claim positions caused by a creditor’s
conduct. 163 Although the creditor must have acted in an objectionable way
to have its claim subordinated, the objectionable behavior is punished for its
effect on other creditors, not its effect on the debtor. This reflects the policy
goal of equitable distribution, and when courts find that the distribution
mandated by the Code’s priority provisions will be unfair to some creditors,
they use their equitable powers to subordinate claims of creditors who acted
badly “to the ethically superior claims asserted by other creditors.”164
Courts have recognized several important limitations on their equitable
powers. Pre-Code courts recognized that their equitable powers were not
plenary but instead confined to the powers granted to the court by the Act,
such as the allowance and disallowance of claims and the collection and
distribution of the bankruptcy estate.165 The equitable subordination cases
refine this limitation, drawing a clear line between denying individual
claims their statutory priority because of creditor misconduct, and
subordinating entire classes of claims based on a general distaste for the
class of claims at issue. 166
It is important to stress the limits on a court’s power to reorder priorities.
The Act, like the Code, established a hierarchy of priority claims.167
Principles of equity did not allow a court to ignore that mandate by
subordinating an entire class of claims to another in clear contravention of
the Act. For example, under the Act, there was only one class of
administrative expenses, and all such expenses were treated equally whether
they were incurred during an attempted reorganization or during the
subsequent liquidation after the reorganization attempt failed.168 In United
States v. Killoren, 169 the court thus rejected the trustee’s request to
subordinate reorganization period taxes to liquidation period administrative
expenses because the classification of claims is a job for Congress, not the
courts. 170
This prohibition on the wholesale reordering of priorities by courts
remains an important limitation on the equitable subordination power. The
161. Asa S. Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 113 (1961).
162. Bostian, 144 F.2d at 801.
163. Id.; In re Automatic Washer Co., 226 F. Supp. 834, 836 (S.D. Iowa 1964).
164. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel), 563 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 1977).
165. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).
166. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 540–41 (1996); United States v. Killoren,
119 F.2d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1941).
167. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 64, 30 Stat. 544.
168. Killoren, 119 F.2d at 366. Today, the Code grants a higher priority to liquidation
period administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2006).
169. 119 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1941).
170. Id. at 366.
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Supreme Court addressed this issue under the Code in United States v.
Noland. 171 In that case, the bankruptcy court had subordinated the
government’s claim for a post-petition non-compensatory tax penalty to
claims of the unsecured creditors, not because of any inequitable conduct by
the government, but because of “the Code’s preference for compensating
actual loss claims.” 172 Because subordination in such a case “runs directly
counter to Congress’s policy judgment that a post-petition tax penalty
should receive the priority of an administrative expense,” the Supreme
Court refused subordination. 173
A concise statement of the equitable principles relied on by courts in
equitably subordinating claims can be found in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel
Co.). 174 In this opinion, the court combined many of the equitable
principles announced by the pre-Code courts into the most commonly used
test for equitable subordination. Under the Mobile Steel test, three
conditions must be satisfied before the court can equitably subordinate a
claim: the claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable
conduct, the misconduct must have resulted in injury to the debtor’s
creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant, and equitable
subordination must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the
bankruptcy statute. 175 The creditor’s conduct must be somehow culpable; it
is not sufficient that the result of a creditor’s actions proves inequitable.176
In addition, a claim should be subordinated “only to the extent necessary to
offset the harm which the bankrupt and its creditors suffered on account of
the inequitable conduct.” 177 While this test does not distinguish between
insider and non-insider creditors, courts have had the opportunity to apply it
more frequently in insider cases. As I discuss below, non-insider claims
can be subordinated under Mobile Steel, and the test should be used to
subordinate the claims of home mortgage lenders that engaged in abusive
lending practices.
B. The (Perhaps False) Distinction Between Insider and Non-Insider
Equitable Subordination Cases
Equitable subordination cases appear to fall into two broad categories:
cases involving claims held by corporate insiders and those involving
claims held by other creditors. Most successful equitable subordination
actions have involved the claims of insider creditors. This abundance of
precedent has led courts and commentators to draw a clear line between

171. 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
172. In re First Truck Lines, Inc., 141 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d sub
nom. I.R.S. v. Noland, 190 B.R. 827 (S.D. Ohio 1993), aff’d sub nom. United States v.
Noland (In re First Truck Lines), 48 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
173. Noland, 517 U.S. at 541.
174. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
175. Id. at 699–700.
176. Noland, 517 U.S. at 539.
177. In re Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 701.
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insider cases and non-insider cases. 178 At first blush the distinction appears
to be significant, with courts in the non-insider claim cases stressing that the
misconduct necessary in those cases must be “more egregious” in order for
such claims to be subordinated. 179 A review of equitable subordination
opinions, however, shows that the distinction between insider cases and
non-insider cases is less significant than it first appears.
1. The Insider Cases
Many equitable subordination cases involve corporate insiders. An
officer, director, or controlling stockholder of a corporation is a fiduciary
who must come to the bankruptcy court with clean hands in presenting a
claim. 180 Under corporate law, an insider’s dealings with a corporation
must be undertaken in good faith and must be inherently fair to the
corporation. 181 In determining fairness, a court must determine whether the
transaction carries “the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.”182 This
search for fairness extends to courts in bankruptcy cases, which have the
power to “sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice
or unfairness is not done in administration of the bankrupt estate.” 183
The insider’s position in the corporation gives that person many
opportunities to engage in conduct that a court might find inequitable. The
misconduct that led to subordination in Pepper v. Litton was a typical
misuse of an insider’s fiduciary status to elevate his position in the
bankruptcy distribution chain over the other creditors of the corporation.184
Because the Court was dealing with fiduciary misconduct, it gave several
178. See, e.g., In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Equitable
subordination typically involves closely-held corporations and their insiders.”); Wilson v.
Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am.), 818 F.2d 1135, 1144 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“This case is unlike most equitable subordination cases in that the claimant . . . is not the
officer/director/controlling shareholder of a debtor . . . .”); Waslow v. MNC Commercial
Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that
“[e]quitable subordination has seldom been invoked, much less successfully so, in cases
involving non-insiders and/or non-fiduciaries”); 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav.
Bank, 169 B.R. 832, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining that “[t]raditionally, equitable
subordination did not apply to ordinary creditors”); DeNatale & Abram, supra note 145, at
424 (arguing that in defining the offending creditor conduct, “the relationship of the creditor
to the debtor is an essential factor”); Timothy A. French, The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine
of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
257, 257 (1995) (claiming that equitable subordination was originally developed by the
courts “as a means of reclassifying or subordinating claims held by corporate insiders”).
179. See, e.g., Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.),
471 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that gross and egregious conduct is required
before the court will equitably subordinate a non-insider, non-fiduciary claim); Estes v.
N&D Props., Inc. (In re N&D Props., Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining
that “[i]f the claimant is not an insider or fiduciary . . . the trustee must prove more egregious
conduct such as fraud, spoliation or overreaching”).
180. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 161, at 101.
181. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 10.01
(2d ed. 2003).
182. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1939).
183. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
184. See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text.
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examples of categories of fiduciary behavior that could lead to
subordination of that fiduciary’s claim, most of which involved the
fiduciary using his position to prefer himself to the disadvantage of the
persons to whom his duties run. 185 The Court explained why claims of
corporate insiders could be subject to equitable subordination, focusing on
the importance of fiduciary duties. The Court in Pepper did not limit
courts’ equitable subordination power to claims of corporate insiders, but
said that a court’s duty to scrutinize claims was “especially clear” in such
cases. 186
A court’s power to equitably subordinate insider claims is especially
clear because of the ability that an insider has to manipulate the affairs of a
corporation for his own benefit and to the detriment of the corporation’s
creditors. 187 As a result, in an insider case, the courts have a ready set of
rules on which to rely: if the corporate insider has breached a fiduciary
duty owed under state law, that insider’s claim can be subordinated under
bankruptcy law. The insider is, in effect, not “honest but unfortunate;” she
has taken advantage of her insider position pre-bankruptcy to the detriment
of the corporation’s creditors in bankruptcy.
There is no precise definition of the inequitable conduct required to
satisfy the first prong of the Mobile Steel test for equitable subordination.
Because most equitable subordination cases have dealt with insider claims,
the required conduct has been defined with reference to insider behavior.
Courts faced with challenges to insider claims have thus developed lists of
behavior that they consider inequitable. For instance, in Mobile Steel the
court focused on initial undercapitalization,188 mismanagement, breach of
fiduciary duties and abuse of fiduciary position. 189 These categories were
specific to the claims being challenged, which arose from loans to the
debtor corporation by insiders and the purchase by the debtor of real
property from insiders. 190
185. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 311 (“He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve
himself first and his cestuis second.”).
186. Id. at 308.
187. Id. at 311.
188. Although Mobile Steel lists undercapitalization as an example of inequitable
behavior, courts almost uniformly hold that undercapitalization must be combined with other
questionable conduct in order for the court to subordinate a claim resulting from an insider’s
transaction with an undercapitalized corporation. See, e.g., In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132
F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that undercapitalization does not, on its own, justify
equitable subordination); Mach. Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d
709, 717 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that undercapitalization can tip the equities toward
subordination); Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990)
(holding that initial undercapitalization, without additional inequitable conduct, is “not a
sufficient basis for the equitable subordination of a claim”). But see Herby’s Foods, Inc. v.
Summit Coffee Co. (In re Herby’s Foods, Inc.), 134 B.R. 207, 211 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991)
(stating that undercapitalization “constitutes a form of inequitable conduct”).
Undercapitalization was described by two commentators as a “bedfellow” of other insider
misconduct. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 161, at 94.
189. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 702–05 (5th Cir.
1977).
190. Id. at 695–98.
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Courts applying Mobile Steel have expanded this list of inequitable
conduct to include fraud, illegality, and the claimant’s use of the debtor as
an alter ego or mere instrumentality. 191 This list is not necessarily
exclusive, and illustrates the scenarios in which courts have equitably
subordinated claims. Again, this list includes the types of bad behavior
engaged in by corporate insiders.
A corporate insider’s access to information about the corporation and
ability to control corporate affairs gives her ample opportunity to engage in
the inequitable conduct supporting subordination. For example, an insider
has the ability to mislead lenders about her company’s financial health by
disguising pre-existing loans. If the outside lender would have no way of
learning of that disguised debt, the insider’s claim will be subordinated to
the claim of the outside lender. 192 Likewise, courts have subordinated
insider claims when the insider induced other creditors to abstain from
collecting on past debts. 193 An insider’s knowledge and control of a
corporation’s finances also gives him the opportunity to enrich himself and
other insiders at the expense of the outside creditors. Courts also find this
type of behavior to satisfy the inequitable conduct prong of Mobile Steel
and have subordinated insider claims when the insider caused the
corporation to redeem the shares of another insider when the corporation
was in a shaky financial condition.194
Insider status, however, is not a sufficient basis for subordination. The
insider relationship simply gives an individual numerous opportunities to
engage in fraud and other improper conduct. 195 Insider status, therefore, is
not a factor in a successful equitable subordination claim, as such status
must always be combined with inequitable conduct. In an insider case it is
relatively easy to find some inequitable conduct justifying subordination of
claims because the questionable conduct by the claimant often involves
some breach of a fiduciary duty. 196 Breach of fiduciary duty, however, is
just one form of inequitable conduct.
In equitably subordinating claims of insiders who breached fiduciary
duties, courts recognized that the insiders did not come to court as honest
but unfortunate creditors. In these cases, creditors who used their inside
position to attempt to gain an advantage over other creditors found their
claims subordinated to those of other creditors.

191. In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d at 344–45; Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical
Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1467 (5th Cir. 1991); Wilson v.
Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am.), 712 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1983).
192. See In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d at 346.
193. See Fabricators, 926 F.2d at 1467.
194. Mach. Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 709, 720 (5th Cir.
1980).
195. Fabricators, 926 F.2d at 1465; George Ashe, Subordination of Claims: Equitable
Principles Applied in Bankruptcy, 72 COM. L.J. 91, 92 (1967).
196. Corporate officers and directors have well-established fiduciary duties, including the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 181, § 10.01, at 476
(“[D]irectors owe a three-fold duty to the corporation . . . . they must be obedient . . . . they
must be diligent . . . . they must be loyal.” (citations omitted)).
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2. The Non-Insider Cases
Although Pepper v. Litton is cited as the classic equitable subordination
case, 197 the courts in pre-Code cases recognized that their power to
equitably subordinate claims was not limited to the claims of corporate
insiders. Most of the cases in which courts subordinated claims involved
breaches of fiduciary duties, but the courts did not, in defining the
parameters of their equitable subordination power, limit that power to the
subordination of insider claims. For example, one court gave a nonexclusive list of the uses of equitable subordination, which included “to
nullify the effect of any fraud that a creditor has committed.”198
When the claim sought to be subordinated is held by a non-insider,
inequitable conduct is often defined in terms of what it is not. This lack of
definition stands in stark contrast to the list of inequitable conduct
developed by courts in insider cases. Part of the reason for this may be the
context in which several of the unsuccessful equitable subordination cases
arose. Many of the lender liability cases of the 1990s involved claims of
overreaching by creditors after default.199 Courts in cases involving arm’slength loans to businesses tended to stress that in order for a lender’s claim
to be subordinated using the principle of equitable subordination, the lender
must do something other than act in the way that lenders traditionally
act. 200 Because the average lender owes no fiduciary duty to the debtor or
its creditors, defining the level of inequitable conduct necessary to
subordinate a non-insider claim is difficult.201 In a recent case, Henry v.
Lehman Commercial Paper (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 202 the
court held that the claimant’s conduct was not inequitable because it did not
contribute to bringing about the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, nor did it
determine the ordering of creditors in the bankruptcy estate.203
Some of these lender liability cases involved lenders who terminated
lines of credit knowing that the debtor would be unable to pay the loan in
full, thus hastening the demise of the debtor’s business. The loan
transaction in Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting204
197. See Carlson, supra note 142, at 198 (describing Pepper v. Litton as the case that
invented equitable subordination); Harry S. Gleick, Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy
Under the Equitable Power of the Bankruptcy Court, 16 BUS. LAW. 611, 614 (1961)
(describing Pepper v. Litton as the best known of all equitable subordination cases).
198. Bostian v. Schapiro (In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co.), 144 F.2d 791, 800 (8th
Cir. 1944).
199. See, e.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc., v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351
(7th Cir. 1990); Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161
B.R. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
200. See Kham & Nate’s Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1358 (“Bank did not create Debtor’s need for
funds, and it was not contractually obliged to satisfy its customer’s desires.”); In re Paolella,
161 B.R. at 120 (finding that the bank “acted within its contractual rights in monitoring the
debtor’s operations and in ceasing to advance funds because the loan was out of formula”).
201. 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank (In re 80 Nassau Assoc.), 169 B.R.
832, 839 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
202. 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
203. Id. at 1007.
204. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
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is typical of the type of transaction for which an equitable subordination
argument fails. The lender in that case had provided both pre-petition and
post-petition financing to the debtor company. About two months after the
debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the lender stated that it would cease advancing
funds to the debtor. The contract between the two provided for cancellation
of the credit line on five days notice to the debtor.205 The Bankruptcy
Court subordinated the creditor’s claim, finding that the creditor was “fully
aware of the Debtor’s plight, and its reliance upon the line of credit, and
disregarded the consequences for the Debtor and its creditors,” 206 but the
Seventh Circuit reversed, citing the need to enforce contracts according to
their terms. 207 In the bad faith cases such as Kham & Nate’s, courts
rejected the argument that lenders, by enforcing their loan terms to the
letter, violate some standard of fairness or decency toward their
borrowers. 208
Courts faced with an equitable subordination attack on a non-insider
claim purport to hold the claimant to a higher standard of misconduct than
that required of those objecting to insider claims. Courts have held that
plaintiffs must show that the arm’s length creditor’s conduct was “gross or
egregious,” and that the plaintiff must prove gross misconduct tantamount
to “fraud, overreaching or spoliation.” 209 One court however has
recognized that, despite the claims of courts to the contrary, there is no
different standard by which to judge non-insider conduct, but rather the
traditional grounds, based on fiduciary duties, are not available when the
claim sought to be subordinated is held by a non-insider. 210
From the opinions granting equitable subordination of a non-insider
claim, one can draw the conclusion that conduct that is harmful to the other
creditors will be considered inequitable if that conduct veers from normal
lending practices. The opinion in Bank of New Richmond v. Production

205. Id. at 1353–54.
206. Id. at 1356.
207. Id. at 1357.
208. Id. at 1357–58; Clark Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Assocs. Commercial Corp. (In re
Clark Pipe and Supply Co.), 893 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that “[t]hrough
its loan agreement, every lender effectively exercises ‘control’ over its borrower to some
degree” and that the purpose of equitable subordination is to “distinguish between the
unilateral remedies that a creditor may properly enforce pursuant to its agreements with the
debtor and other inequitable conduct such as fraud, misrepresentation, or the exercise of . . .
total control over the debtor”); Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella &
Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (denying equitable subordination when faced
with a lender who exercised enhanced monitoring rights over its borrower pursuant to the
terms of its loan agreement); Speth v. Whitham Farms Feedyard, L.P. (In re Sunbelt Grain
WKS, LLC), 406 B.R. 918, 934 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009) (“Indeed, the record suggests nothing
more than [the creditor’s] apparent exercise of its rights under the loan documents . . . .”);
Overby, supra note 113, at 1014.
209. In re Paolella, 161 B.R. at 119; see also Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc.
(In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 471 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that gross and
egregious conduct on the part of the outside claimant is necessary for equitable
subordination).
210. 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank. (In re 80 Nassau Assocs.), 169 B.R.
832, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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Credit Ass’n (In re Osborne) 211 nicely illustrates the distinction between
normal and unusual lending practices. The complaining creditors in
Osborne urged the court to subordinate the claim of the Production Credit
Association (PCA) for two reasons: the PCA controlled the debtor’s
business and the PCA misrepresented the degree of support that it would
give to the debtors. 212 To prove control, the complaining creditors (who
supplied farm supplies to the debtor) showed that the PCA gave the debtor
instructions on how to spend the loan funds. 213 The court found, however,
that this is not the type of control required under the various equitable
subordination tests; it was control that arose out of the PCA’s status as a
creditor with a security interest in most of the debtor’s assets.214 Because
the court found no control, the court required the other creditors to show
“gross misconduct.” 215
The plaintiff’s use of “control” as an example of inequitable conduct is a
good example of a plaintiff straining to fit non-insider conduct into one of
the fiduciary misconduct categories. Control, even if found, is relevant
only to the extent that it allows the claimant to engage in inequitable
conduct. Because the PCA in Osborne was making payments directly to
some of Osborne’s creditors on Osborne’s account, it had such an
opportunity because it was in regular contact with some of the other
creditors. The PCA assured one of the complaining creditors that the
creditor would be paid even though the PCA knew of the debtor’s dire
financial condition and that it would be terminating support for the
debtor. 216 The court thus found the requisite level of inequitable conduct,
because the PCA had superior knowledge regarding the debtor’s financial
condition and used that knowledge to induce the creditor to continue
supplying feed to the debtor. 217 Compared to the other creditors, the PCA
was less “honest but unfortunate” and therefore found its claims
subordinated to those of the creditors who relied on its misstatements.
Even inside information allowing a creditor to gain an advantage over
other creditors is not necessary if that creditor’s actions improperly allow it
to gain priority over the debtor’s other creditors. The subordinated claimant
in First National Bank of Gatlinburg v. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. (In re
Just for the Fun of It of Tennessee, Inc.) 218 was one of many contractors on
an amusement park project. That creditor, Botkin, filed a notice of
completion in the public record as general contractor for the project. Once
the notice was filed, other contractors had a short period of time within
which to file any lien notices. Because Botkin misrepresented both that he
was the general contractor and that the project was complete, the court
subordinated his claim to those of the creditors who were deceived to their
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

42 B.R. 988 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
Id. at 989.
Id. at 990.
Id. at 997.
Id.
Id. at 999–1000.
Id.
7 B.R. 166 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
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detriment by the false notice.219 Again, the subordinated creditor was
deemed “dishonest” and undeserving of its statutory priority.
Courts have been open to arguments that the non-insider’s conduct at the
outset of the lending relationship might be inequitable if the loan is unusual
enough. The facts in Nicholson v. Core (In re Carolee’s Combine, Inc.)220
could be said to illustrate a creative lending practice. Carolee’s Combine
was organized to conduct an auction of architectural antiques. Because of
the high cost of acquiring and refurbishing the goods to be sold and the
difficulty of raising funds through conventional means, the principals of the
company embarked on what the bankruptcy court described as “an
inventive money raising scheme.” 221 To attract investors in the auction
company, the principals promised investors that their money would be
returned on the first day of the auction with ten percent annual interest. In
addition, those investors would receive at the same time a “finder’s fee”
equal to ten percent of their investment. The auction company’s obligation
to each investor was evidenced by two documents: a promissory note and a
“Finder’s Fee Letter.” 222 In subordinating the investors’ claims to the
claims of the debtor’s trade and other creditors, the court stressed that the
investors “advanced monies to a speculative venture for the promise of a
high return,” and while that in itself is not inequitable, the court added that
the investors “shifted the risk of that speculation to general creditors by
arranging to be paid in advance.” 223
Courts have also discussed whether a lender whose loan agreement
contains onerous terms has engaged in inequitable conduct warranting
subordination. The opinion in In re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co.224
supports the argument that equitable subordination might be used to combat
abusive lending practices. The questioned loans in In re Elkins-Dell were
business loans that carried high rates of interest and gave the creditors a
great deal of control over the debtor’s finances. One lender, Fidelity,
required that the debtor finance only through it and through no other
lenders. 225 Fidelity also reserved the power to unilaterally change the terms
of the loan agreement by giving notice of the changes by certified mail.
The trustee, in seeking equitable disallowance of Fidelity’s claim, argued
that the loan contract was unconscionable. 226

219. Id. at 180–81.
220. 3 B.R. 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
221. Id. at 326.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 328.
224. 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
225. Id. at 866.
226. Id. at 866–67. Because there was no specific equitable subordination provision in
the Act, courts applied the same standards to both equitably subordinate and equitably
disallow claims. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308–09 (1939) (explaining that the
“Deep Rock” doctrine, as set forth in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307
(1939), allows claims of corporate insiders to be disallowed or subordinated when courts
“are satisfied that allowance of the claims would not be fair or equitable to other creditors”).
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The court declined to disallow Fidelity’s claim, remanding for further
development of the factual record on unconscionability. 227 Nevertheless,
the opinion contains some useful guidance on whether abusive loan terms
could ever result in subordination of a lender’s claim. First, the court
explained that federal law could govern unconscionability in determining
whether a claim could be allowed because a bankruptcy claimant “ask[s] a
favor” of the bankruptcy court. 228 The court also noted that while it was
reluctant to deny enforcement of a loan contract between two businesses
like the one before it, it might not be as reluctant to deny enforcement of a
consumer loan contract. 229 Last, the court cautioned that regulation of
oppressive loan products was the job of the legislature, not the judiciary,230
but suggested that it might be inclined to disallow a lender’s claim if the
loan terms bore no reasonable relationship to business risks.231
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana recently equitably
subordinated a non-insider claim in an opinion that seems to require that
creditors be “honest but unfortunate” in order to obtain the relief given to
creditors in bankruptcy. Tim Blixseth, the principal of the borrower in
Credit Suisse v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) 232 does not elicit much sympathy. One
can assume that he is a sophisticated businessperson; he developed “the
world’s only private ski and golf community.” 233 Credit Suisse contacted
Blixseth to offer him a new loan product, a syndicated term loan, which
Credit Suisse analogized to a home-equity loan. 234 This new loan product
enabled Credit Suisse to offer larger loans to borrowers than it had been
previously able to offer. 235
Although it seems that Blixseth’s conduct, not Credit Suisse’s conduct,
precipitated the Yellowstone Mountain Club’s bankruptcy filing, 236 the
opinion contains some reasoning that could be useful to courts in
refashioning equitable subordination to punish creative lending practices.
In subordinating Credit Suisse’s claim, the court described Credit Suisse’s
“naked greed” combined with its “complete disregard for the Debtors or
any other person or entity who was subordinated to Credit Suisse’s first lien
position” as conduct that shocked the conscience of the court.237
227. In re Elkins-Dell, 253 F. Supp. at 875.
228. Id. at 869.
229. Id. at 871.
230. Id. at 872.
231. Id. at 873.
232. No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2047 (Bankr. D. Mont.
May 12, 2009).
233. Id. at *7. The New York Times described the Yellowstone Club’s bankruptcy filing
as “one of the signature, fin de siècle moments of our passing Gilded Age.” Amy Wallace,
Checkmate at the Yellowstone Club, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at BU1.
234. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2047, at *8–9.
235. Id. at *9.
236. The Credit Agreement provided that most of the loan proceeds could be used for
purposes other than development of the Yellowstone Club, and Blixseth in fact used the
funds for other purposes. Id. at *15–16
237. Id. at *31.
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In deciding to subordinate the claim, the court relied on both the debtor’s
questionable financial condition at the time the loan was made and the
failure of Credit Suisse to perform adequate due diligence. For example,
Credit Suisse never requested audited financial statements from the debtors,
relying instead on the debtors’ own historical and future projections.238
Additionally, the court found that Credit Suisse was offering a new loan
product and was driven by the fees it received for these loans. 239
The opinion is couched in predatory lending language, a point made by
many members of the legal community in criticizing the result.240 While
such language is almost unheard of in cases involving commercial loans, it
could be useful in attacking some consumer lending practices. The In re
Yellowstone Mountain Club opinion was vacated after the parties reached a
settlement, 241 but it is particularly useful in that it defined inequitable
conduct in terms of what it is rather than what it is not.
IV. WHY EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION IS A GOOD REMEDY FOR CREATIVE
LENDING PRACTICES, DESPITE POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
Equitable subordination can be a useful tool in attacking abusive lending
practices because it must be applied only on a case-by-case basis and not
against all mortgage creditors who find that their collateral is worth less
than the amount outstanding on their loans. While granting special priority
to home mortgage creditors seems like a bad policy in the wake of the
mortgage crisis, it is up to Congress, not the courts, to remove that special
priority. Yet courts have the power to make exceptions to this special
priority when justified by the facts of a particular home mortgage claim. 242
The subordination approach would be an appropriate way of dealing with a
home mortgage lender who engaged in abusive lending practices because,
although such a lender is a creditor who is owed a legally enforceable

238. Id. at *11.
239. Id. at *31.
240. See, e.g., Jo Ann J. Brighton & Felton E. Parrish, Yellowstone: New Standards for
Lender Liability in Today’s Economic Climate, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2009, at 28;
Hedge Funds and Bankruptcy: Credit Suisse and Yellowstone are Big Boys, BULLIVANT,
HOUSER, BAILEY P.C. (May 19, 2009), http://www.bullivant.com/Hedge-Funds-andBankruptcy; Weathering the Storm: Look Out Lenders—Collecting Fees for Loaning Money
May Be Considered Evil, HAYNES AND BOONE’S NEWSROOM (June 12, 2009),
http://www.haynesboone.com/weathering_the_storm_look_out_lenders/; In re Yellowstone
Mountain Club, LLC—The Pitfalls of “Equitable Subordination” for the Unwary Lender,
WHITE & CASE CLIENT ALERT (June 4, 2009), http://www.whitecase.com/
files/Publication/0e4b30ee-17f3-411b-bfff9b4df82f5a44/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/843ae7fa-ae7b-4c75-a666-a94df156335e/alert_In_re_Yellowstone_MountainClubLLC.pdf.
241. Jessica Katz, Secured Creditor’s Claim Equitably Subordinated by Bankruptcy
Court, ABI COMMITTEE NEWS, SECURED CREDIT COMMITTEE, VOL. 6, NO. 1 (July 2009),
available
at
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/financebank/vol6num1/
secured.html.
242. See Merrimac Paper Co. v. Harrison (In re Merrimac Paper Co.), 420 F.3d 53, 61
(1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[s]uch case-by-case adjudication is at the core of judicial
competence”).
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obligation, equity might require that a portion of that lender’s claim be
treated as unsecured and that its loan terms be modified. 243
A court should be able to both cram down the home mortgagee’s claim
and modify its interest rate using equitable subordination. Bifurcation of
the undersecured mortgagee’s claim into a secured and an unsecured claim
would recognize the true nature of many abusive loans. Most subprime
mortgage loans were used to refinance existing mortgage loans. Borrowers
were encouraged to use their homes like credit cards. 244 By treating the
portion of a home mortgage loan that exceeds the value of the home as
unsecured, a court using equitable subordination would recognize that to the
extent a home mortgage lender is in fact an unsecured creditor like a credit
card issuer, it is also an unsecured creditor for priority purposes.
Yet the home mortgagee enjoys a special priority not only because it is
treated as a fully-secured creditor regardless of the value of its collateral but
also because it is entitled to enforce its original loan terms. These loan
terms often include a higher interest rate than that which a court would
permit to be paid to other holders of secured claims in Chapter 13.245 A
court exercising equitable subordination should thus also lower the interest
rate payable on the home mortgage loan because only by doing so will the
court deny the mortgagee its special priority and allow all creditors to be
treated fairly in bankruptcy.
A. Abusive Lending and the Mobile Steel Test
In order for a court to equitably subordinate a claim, the claimant must
have engaged in some inequitable conduct. Congress intended that courts
develop the concept of equitable subordination over time, and while it is
said to be a rare and limited remedy, 246 the recent subprime mortgage crisis
precipitated by abusive lending practices gives courts a unique opportunity
to remedy the harm that was done by these practices and discourage the

243. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, ¶ 510.01 (stating that § 510(c)
“provides for the subordination of allowed claims, when principles of equity would be
offended by the treatment of such claims as senior or on a parity with those of other
creditors”); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 161, at 86 (arguing that subordination “should be
ordered when the claimant is undeniably a creditor, but for reasons of equity should be
relegated to a rank inferior to that of general creditors”).
244. See Adams, supra note 49, at 604 (explaining that changes to the Internal Revenue
Code made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made the use of home equity for purposes other
than home improvement more appealing); Dickerson, supra note 80, at 24–25 (explaining
that most subprime loans were refinance loans and that most home equity lines of credit
were used for purposes other than home improvement and suggesting a rebuttable
presumption under which home equity and refinance loans would be treated as general
unsecured loans unless they were used for housing purposes or to reduce overall debt);
White, supra note 49, at 630 (explaining that one of the “principal marketing themes of
subprime lenders was to encourage consumers with multiple credit card accounts to
refinance the credit card debt with a mortgage refinance loan”).
245. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
246. Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d
1458, 1464 (5th Cir. 1991).
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lenders, brokers, and investors responsible for these practices from
engaging in them in the future.
Bankruptcy courts should develop a federal standard for inequitable
conduct because of the special favors that creditors receive under
bankruptcy law. 247 State laws vary greatly in their treatment of abusive
mortgage lending practices,248 but full payment on the original loan terms is
a special benefit granted by bankruptcy law. Because of this special
bankruptcy benefit, it is appropriate to hold mortgage lenders to a
bankruptcy standard of good behavior.
Lender behavior that departs from standard lending practices should be
considered inequitable conduct.249 Many subprime loans were made to
individuals who could not afford them. The U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development promulgates affordable housing standards that
compare a household’s income to its monthly housing costs. A household
that is paying over 30% of its income toward housing costs is deemed to be
living in unaffordable housing. 250 Making an affordable loan is a normal
and prudent lending practice, therefore a lender who makes a loan to a
homebuyer knowing that the loan will make the home unaffordable is a
lender whose behavior merits punishment. Many subprime mortgage loans
resulted in payments that far exceeded the housing cost to income ratio that
would make a home affordable.251 Lenders who make such loans are not
relying on the debtor’s ability to repay out of income; they are relying on
either another bank’s willingness to refinance when the interest rate resets
or on repayment when the property is sold at a higher price. This is not a
normal lending practice, in fact, it looks more like an equity investment in a
business. 252
Loan terms that bear no reasonable relationship to the risk of nonpayment are often also the result of inequitable lender conduct.253 There is
evidence that borrowers who could qualify for “prime” loans were steered
to “subprime” loan products. Many of the borrowers inappropriately
247. See supra notes 224–31 and accompanying text.
248. A list of state laws governing subprime and predatory mortgage lending can be
found on the National Conference of State Legislatures’ web site. Mortgage Lending
Practices, Subprime and Predatory Mortgage Lending, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12511 (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
Vern Countryman, in arguing for equitable subordination or disallowance of the claims of
improvident lenders, suggested that bankruptcy courts should develop standards for
unconscionability because the development of the concept of unconscionability in state
courts was “extremely spotty.” Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy
Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 430 (1972).
249. See supra notes 234–41 and accompanying text.
250. For a detailed discussion of these standards, see Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra
note 13, at 1135–40.
251. See Adams, supra note 49, at 606 (reporting that more than one-half of the subprime
adjustable rate mortgage loans originated in 2006 had a monthly debt service to income ratio
of over 40%).
252. Mechele Dickerson calls this “asset-based” lending, and classifies it as a type of
predatory lending because the lenders have the goal of receiving the borrower’s house, not
receiving timely repayments. Dickerson, supra note 80, at 33.
253. See supra notes 224–31 and accompanying text.
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steered towards higher cost loans were elderly and minority borrowers.254
In addition, because subprime loans were more profitable for lenders than
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans designed for first-time
buyers, many lenders steered FHA-eligible buyers to subprime loans.255
Such steering is an example of behavior that may be legal, 256 but certainly
is objectionable. Steering to reap greater fees is a type of self-dealing.
Although lenders have no fiduciary duties to their borrowers, loan terms
that are motivated not by non-payment risk but by the desire to earn higher
fees should certainly be viewed as inequitable, especially when the
borrower is a consumer.
Under the second prong of the Mobile Steel test, the claimant’s
misconduct must have resulted in injury to the debtor’s creditors or
conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant. 257 Abusive lenders engaged
in several lending practices that showed little regard for their borrowers’
ability to repay their loans. One was the practice of making low and no
documentation loans. 258 Another was the practice of ignoring affordable
housing standards in making mortgage loans. 259 A third was making loans
with initially high loan to value ratios.260 These lending practices all led to
loans with a high risk of default. When a mortgage lender makes a loan to a
borrower with little regard for the borrower’s ability to repay, that lender
injures other creditors because funds that would otherwise go to those
creditors outside of bankruptcy are diverted to pay an unusually large and
expensive mortgage loan. Even prudent creditors may end up with
borrowers who cannot repay their loans because of job losses and other
254. See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 48, at 284 (noting that more than half of the mortgage
loans obtained by African-Americans and 40% of those obtained by Latinos were subprime);
Dickerson, supra note 80, at 35 (reporting that “homeowners in high-income black
neighborhoods are twice as likely as homeowners in low-income white neighborhoods to
have subprime loans” (emphasis omitted)); Painter, supra note 64, at 89 (arguing that the
lack of competitive pressure on subprime lenders is “evidenced by the number of borrowers
with good or excellent credit scores” who purchase their homes using subprime loans); Alan
M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based Mortgage
Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REV. 678, 701–02 (2009) (discussing the New York Attorney General’s
investigation of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., which found that “black and Hispanic
customers with high credit scores were much more likely to receive subprime products”).
255. See White, supra note 49, at 624–25 (explaining the credit scores of FHA and
subprime homebuyers).
256. The Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibit racial
discrimination in mortgage terms, but direct proof of racial discrimination in loan approval is
rare. See White, supra note 254, at 705 (arguing that the enforcement of fair lending laws
“must respond to the more subtle but invidious mechanisms of the new price
discrimination”). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed
in 2010 prohibits some of the abusive practices discussed in this article. For example, it
gives a borrower a defense to foreclosure when there is a violation of the act’s provisions
that prohibit steering borrowers to particular mortgage products and making loans without
regard to the borrower’s ability to repay. Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1403–14, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010). The new legislation will not affect the abusive mortgage loans that are currently
outstanding.
257. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
258. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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upheavals, but those creditors did nothing to contribute to the risk of nonpayment and should not be punished by the exercise of equitable
subordination.
After a borrower becomes unable to pay, the mortgagee should be able to
rely on the value of the mortgaged home for repayment. Yet many
subprime lenders lent money based on inflated appraisals.261 Negligently
prepared appraisals might cause borrowers to pay too much for property
and can leave junior lenders seriously undersecured or completely
unsecured at the time of foreclosure. 262 Overappraisal causes similar harms
in bankruptcy: junior mortgagees end up with no collateral, and the holders
of unsecured claims suffer even greater harm when the home mortgage
lender is entitled to full payment of not the amount that the property would
bring at a foreclosure sale, but instead the amount that it is owed on the
loan. Overappraisal is exactly the type of creditor behavior that should lead
to equitable subordination of the creditor’s claim, as it is more likely that an
overappraised house will be subject to a mortgage in excess of the home’s
value. 263
A lender who makes an abusive mortgage loan without regard to a
homeowner’s ability to pay and without serious attention to the value of the
mortgaged property clearly improves its bankruptcy position against other
secured and unsecured creditors of the debtor. A Chapter 13 debtor cures
all arrearages and maintains payment on long-term debt during the term of
the plan. 264 Therefore, she will make her original payments, which may
include a high interest rate on a secured claim in excess of the value of her
house, plus all overdue amounts, which may include exorbitant fees. A
debtor must commit her “disposable income” to the payment of unsecured
claims under a Chapter 13 plan, and the payments on secured debts are
deducted from the debtor’s income in calculating disposable income. 265 As
a result, a loan that carries the hallmarks of an abusive loan—high fees, a
high interest rate, and a high loan-to-value ratio—depletes the amount of
money available to the debtor’s other creditors. All mortgage loans do so,
but abusive lending practices result in higher payments, and they are more
likely to result in mortgage liens that exceed the value of the home.
By making loans that depleted borrower wealth rather than enabling
borrowers to increase their wealth, subprime home mortgage lenders
harmed other lenders. First, debtors were required to commit large
261. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. There is evidence that lenders pressured
appraisers to inflate home values. Eggert, supra note 49, at 1287.
262. Robin Paul Malloy, Lender Liability for Negligent Real Estate Appraisals, 1984 U.
ILL. L. REV. 53, 59–60.
263. See Miles, supra note 35, at 265–66 (discussing testimony from the early 1990s
suggesting that most underwater mortgages were the result of overappraisals or were held by
second mortgagees who lent against property in which the debtor had little equity).
264. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2006).
265. Id. §§ 707(b)(2), 1325(b)(3). These Code sections specify that payments on secured
debt are subtracted from current monthly income for above-median debtors. For other
debtors, “disposable income” means current monthly income minus “amounts reasonably
necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor.” Id. § 1325(b)(2).
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percentages of their income to mortgage payments, reducing their ability to
pay other creditors. Second, high fees and interest rates led to defaults, and
these back payments were added to the loans, depleting the homeowners’
already scant equity. 266 In those cases, the lender can be seen as another
investor in the property, just as a corporate insider who makes a
questionable loan to a corporation is viewed as an equity investor. By
making a loan without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay, the lender
is draining the future bankruptcy estate of assets that could be used to pay
other creditors because all appreciation in the value of the home will be
paid to the mortgage creditor, not the other creditors.
The third Mobile Steel prong requires that the exercise of equitable
subordination must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Code. 267
Initially, reducing the claim of a home mortgage creditor might seem to fly
in the face of the clear language of the Code. The result of equitable
subordination is often to reorder the priorities set forth in the Code,
however. If we view the enhanced property right of a mortgage creditor as
a priority classification, then subordinating the unsecured portion of such
claim so that it enjoys the same priority as unsecured claims is consistent
with other exercises of the equitable subordination power.
Congress granted home mortgage lenders special priority and has resisted
removing that special treatment. 268 That fact might lead some to argue that
a court cannot equitably subordinate the claims of home mortgage creditors.
But I do not suggest reducing the claims of all home mortgage creditors,
only those who engaged in inequitable conduct. Therefore, such an
exercise would comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in Noland, which
prohibits the equitable subordination of entire classes of claims on a general
categorical level.269 Subordinating the claims of abusive home mortgage
lenders would further the purpose of equitable subordination: to ensure that
injustice is not done in the administration of the bankruptcy estate.270
B. Possible Objections to Using Equitable Subordination To Cram Down
Home Mortgages
There are several possible objections to using equitable subordination to
modify home mortgages. One objection is that no long-term debt can be
modified and paid outside of a Chapter 13 plan. Another is that the
claimants who will be punished are often not the entities who originated the
abusive loans. A third objection is that the questionable practices were
widespread; all lenders in the subprime sector were making questionable
loans, and therefore, the practices should not be considered inequitable. A
final objection is that debtors who borrowed responsibly will get no relief,
and debtors who were most likely over their heads will. These arguments
are discussed below.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Painter, supra note 64, at 94.
Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text.
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When Congress first proposed allowing mortgage modification,
proponents of the legislation argued that home mortgages had been unfairly
singled out for better treatment than other secured debts by Congress in
1978. According to that argument, if a debtor can cram down and
otherwise modify a mortgage on a vacation home or investor property in
Chapter 13, a debtor should be able to cram down a home mortgage as
well. 271 Others have explained that the ability of a debtor to cram down a
mortgage on a second home in Chapter 13 is not as broad as it might seem
because of the Code’s mandate that a Chapter 13 debtor pay the value of an
allowed secured claim (the stripped down mortgage claim) over the course
of the three-to-five-year plan. 272 While the scant case law favors the latter
position, 273 the reasoning in those cases does not prevent a court from
modifying a mortgage using equitable subordination. Whether other longterm debt can be stripped down or not should be irrelevant to a court’s
decision to equitably subordinate an abusive mortgage creditor’s claim.
The point of equitable subordination is to remedy inequities caused by the
bad behavior of a creditor, not to change the priority of an entire class of
claims.
A major force behind abusive lending was securitization. 274 As a result,
the entities asserting mortgage claims in a bankruptcy case are often not the
entities who engaged in the questionable lending practices. This issue was
raised by some of the critics of In re Yellowstone Mountain Club.275 The
subordinated loan in In re Yellowstone Mountain Club was made by a
lending syndicate led by Credit Suisse, the party whose behavior the court
found egregious. During the litigation, however, no one raised the issue of
whether only the portion of the loan retained by Credit Suisse should be
subordinated. 276
The question of whether a court can equitably subordinate a claim held
by someone other than the original wrongdoer is one on which there is little
case law. When it was raised in one of the Enron proceedings in the
Southern District of New York, it was a question of first impression in the
Second Circuit. 277 The Enron court held that § 510(c) could not be applied
271. Credit Cards and Bankruptcy: Opportunities for Reform: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 32 (2008) (written testimony of Robert M. Lawless),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/08-12-04LawlessTestimony.pdf; Adam J.
Levitin, Back to the Future with Chapter 13: A Response to Professor Scarberry, 37 PEPP.
L. REV. 1261, 1267 (2010); Levitin, supra note 13, at 581.
272. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5) (2006); Mark S. Scarberry, A Critique of Congressional
Proposals to Permit Modification of Home Mortgages in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 37 PEPP.
L. REV. 635, 717–21 (2010).
273. See, e.g., Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that a debtor could not both strip down a mortgage lien and invoke the
right to cure and maintain under Chapter 13); In re Bulson, 327 B.R. 830, 847 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2005) (holding that a stripped-down mortgage claim must be paid in full during the
plan period).
274. See generally Eggert, supra note 49.
275. See, e.g., Brighton & Parrish, supra note 240.
276. Id.
277. Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assoc. (In re Enron Corp.), 379 B.R. 425, 428 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
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to a transferee of a claim who himself had not acted inequitably “merely
because that claim was transferred, directly or indirectly, by a bad actor.”278
The court in Enron relied in part on the lack of case law allowing
equitable subordination against transferees because of transferor conduct.279
Congress, however, intended that courts continually develop standards for
equitable subordination. 280 Abusive mortgage practices give the courts a
perfect opportunity to stop these practices by subordinating claims held by
investors. In the case of securitized subprime mortgages, there is
considerable evidence that investors in subprime securities knew that these
securities were risky. 281 Their very risk is what drew investors to securities
made up of subprime loans—in exchange for that risk, they carried greater
returns. 282 If a subprime mortgage goes into foreclosure, the investors will
take the loss. A bankruptcy cramdown will only reflect that loss.
A third objection is that abusive lending practices were so widespread
that the terms might not be seen as unusual. Given the universal scorn of
these practices, and the evidence that subprime loan terms were often driven
by concerns other than the borrower’s default risk, their ubiquity should not
prevent equitable subordination. Tort law provides a useful analogy in this
regard. In a 1906 negligence case, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously stated that “[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what ought
to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.” 283 Justice Learned
Hand complemented this rule in 1932, stating, “in most cases reasonable
prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available
devices.” 284 While in tort law it is said to be rare that an entire industry
engages in unsafe practices, 285 we know that in the past decade, an entire
sub-industry of lenders followed unsafe practices in making loans to home
mortgage borrowers. As a result, the fact that all subprime lenders engaged
in these practices should not prevent a court from finding that the practices
were inequitable.
A final possible objection is that borrowers who borrowed within their
means and whose mortgages became undersecured because of a market
decline would get no relief under this proposal, while borrowers who
borrowed more than they could pay would. In essence, an honest but
unfortunate debtor saddled with an underwater mortgage would be denied
278. Id. at 440.
279. Id.
280. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
281. Eggert, supra note 49, at 1303.
282. Id.
283. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (citing Wabash Ry. Co.
v. McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454 (1883)).
284. New Eng. Coal & Coke Co. v. N. Barge Corp. (The T.J. Hooper), 60 F.2d 737, 740
(2d Cir. 1932).
285. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV.
285, 294 (2008) (observing that “self-incriminating industry practices” like those followed in
The T.J. Hooper rarely take place today).
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relief because his lender was honest in the initiation of the loan and
unfortunate when the market dropped. That is true because only abusive
lenders would find their claims stripped down under this proposal. Abusive
lenders acted imprudently in extending credit by ignoring affordable
housing guidelines and making loans with high loan-to-value ratios and
thus increased the chances that their borrowers would default on their loans.
Congress chose to give home mortgage lenders favorable treatment, and in
the absence of lender bad behavior, they should receive that treatment until
Congress changes the rule.
On the other hand, not all irresponsible borrowers will get relief. A
borrower who obtained a true “liar’s loan” in that he misrepresented his
income on his loan application would not be able to discharge the
unsecured portion of his home mortgage debt. 286 Therefore, a court that
equitably subordinates the unsecured portion of a home mortgage would be
inquiring into the “honest but unfortunate” nature of both the debtor and his
creditors.
CONCLUSION
In one of the few law review articles that comprehensively addressed
equitable subordination in bankruptcy, Asa Herzog and Joel Zweibel
concluded that “where man’s ingenuity creates new situations without
precise factual precedent, equity has the capacity to adapt itself . . . .
[e]quity will be found equal to the task, extending old principles, if
necessary, to accomplish its purpose.” 287 Human ingenuity created abusive
home lending practices, and equity should intervene to ensure that those
who engaged in such practices are not rewarded.
Equitable subordination is an excellent tool for combating abusive
lending practices for several reasons. First, it can be used in the absence of
legislative action. Unlike the various legislative proposals of the past few
years, equitable subordination is flexible and durable. Several of the failed
bills sought to provide relief only to homeowners whose mortgage loans
were in existence at the time the legislation went into effect.288 Such
measures may have been effective to alleviate the current mortgage crisis,
but would have done nothing for creative lending practices that may arise in
the future. 289 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
286. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006) (providing that an individual cannot discharge a debt
obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud” or by a materially false
written statement respecting the individual’s financial condition on which the creditor
reasonably relied).
287. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 161, at 113. It is important to note that in 1972 Vern
Countryman made a similar suggestion with respect to lenders who made “improvident”
loans to consumers. He made this suggestion because such lenders extended credit “on
volume rather than on diligent credit investigation.” Countryman, supra note 248, at 431.
288. See Zinman & Petrovski, supra note 17, at 141–43 (describing the Helping Families
Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. (2009), and the
Senate bill of the same name, S. 61, 111th Cong. (2009)).
289. A similar criticism is being aimed at proposals to submit systemically significant
financial institutions to FDIC resolution authority. See Too Big to Fail: The Role for
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Protection Act, passed in the summer of 2010, aims to curb the practices
that led to the current crisis, 290 but it does nothing to give relief to the
homeowners already harmed by these practices. Dodd-Frank is a step in the
right direction because, in the absence of regulation, it is likely that
dangerous loan products will reappear on the market, 291 but equitable
subordination allows judges to deal with any abusive practices not
anticipated by Congress in 2010. Judges, with their power to equitably
readjust the bankruptcy distribution to ensure that “injustice or unfairness is
not done in the administration of [a] bankrupt[cy] estate,” 292 should send a
message to those involved in abusive lending practices that the claims
arising from those practices will not get favorable treatment in bankruptcy
because they did not come to court as honest but unfortunate creditors.

Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation Reform: Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13–16 (2009)
(testimony of Harvey R. Miller, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, NY), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Miller091022.pdf.
290. See supra note 256.
291. White, supra note 49, at 635. (“There is little reason to believe that another cycle of
credit expansion, lax underwriting and hunger for yield will not produce a similar set of
dangerous products . . . .”).
292. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308 (1939).

